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A  HOUSE  DIVIDED:  WHEN  STATE  AND  LOWER
FEDERAL  COURTS  DISAGREE  ON  FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS
Wayne A. Logan*
“The operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the same state is plainly
hostile to the reign of law.  Janus was not a god of justice.”1
Despite our many differences, “We the People”2 take as a given that
rights contained in our Federal Constitution will apply with equal force
throughout the land.  As John Jay put it in The Federalist No. 22, “we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the
same national rights, privileges, and protection.”3  To better ensure federal
rights uniformity, the Framers included the Supremacy Clause in the Consti-
tution4 and ordained that there be “one supreme Court”5 to harmonize what
Justice Joseph Story termed “jarring and discordant judgments”6 of lower
courts, giving rise to “public mischiefs.”7
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1 Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 525 (1928).
2 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land”).
5 Id. art. III, § 1.  Circuit riding by the Justices provides further evidence of the desire
for uniformity, vis-a`-vis the lower federal courts. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211,
1218 (2004).
6 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (Story, J.).
7 Id.; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
(positing the “necessity of uniformity” on federal constitutional matters); Martin, 14 U.S.
235
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Federal constitutional rights, however, have never applied in uniform
fashion nationwide, and rights uniformity has long numbered among the
legal myths de Tocqueville recognized as central to American governance.8
In a recent article, I chronicled how federal rights disuniformity plays out in
the context of the nation’s twelve regional federal circuit courts of appeal.9
Focusing on Fourth Amendment doctrine in particular, the article high-
lighted the existence of over three dozen circuit splits, many concerning
quite common and basic search and seizure issues.10
The variation underscored the challenge entailed in realizing the
Supreme Court’s expectation that the Fourth Amendment is “enforceable in
the same manner and to like effect” nationwide.11  The article also surveyed
the many practical and theoretical ramifications of what Justice Scalia
recently condemned as a “crazy quilt” of federal constitutional rights,12 gen-
erated by a single sovereign’s judicial system—the nation’s federal circuit
courts.
This Article shifts focus, examining state court contributions to federal
constitutional diversity.  Typically operating out of the public and scholarly
limelight, state courts have long shared a concurrent obligation with lower
federal courts to interpret the U.S. Constitution13 and protect the rights con-
tained in it.14  Critically important as well, state courts do so independently
of their federal counterparts.  They need not defer to the constitutional posi-
(1 Wheat.) at 347–48 (Story, J.) (stressing need for uniformity “throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution” and condemning
disuniformity as “truly deplorable”).
8 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835) (observing that “[t]he government
of the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions”).
9 See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2012).
10 Id. at 1148–50.
11 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
12 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Danforth
v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 302 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that federal
rights must be “applied equally” in “every one of the several States” (quoting Sandra Day
O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
13 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (“Federal [constitutional] law is
enforceable in state courts . . . because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are
as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature.  The Supremacy Clause
makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state courts with a coordi-
nate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure.”).
14 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (“State courts . . . are not merely free to—
they are bound to—interpret the United States Constitution.”); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (“[S]tate courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the fed-
eral courts to safeguard constitutional rights . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (“Upon the State courts, equally with the
courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted
or secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . .”).
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tions adopted by federal circuit courts,15 including those in which they are
geographically situated,16 which lack direct appellate review authority over
them.17  As a consequence, on all issues other than the comparatively narrow
range of questions expressly addressed by the Supreme Court,18 state and
lower federal courts are free to disagree, creating conditions ripe for the con-
stitutional conflict feared by the Framers.
This Article provides the first in-depth examination of state-federal con-
current constitutional authority and does so by focusing on a context in
which its consequences are most problematic: within individual states.  While
a handful of articles over the years have examined state court power vis-a`-vis
federal constitutional questions more generally,19 no systematic effort has
been undertaken to examine intrastate, state-federal conflict on federal con-
15 See State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 403 (N.J. 1965) (“In passing on federal constitu-
tional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility
and occupy the same position; there is parallelism but not paramountcy for both sets of
courts are governed by the same reviewing authority of the Supreme Court.”).
16 See, e.g., Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) (“Though state courts
may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes
their state they are not obliged to do so.” (citation omitted)); State v. McDowell, 310 S.E.2d
301, 310 (N.C. 1984) (noting that it “accord[s] . . . decisions of lower federal courts such
persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command”).
17 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970)
(noting that “because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state
tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts”).
18 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825) (“[T]he construction
given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the
true construction . . . .”).  Yet even on matters that the Court has addressed uncertainty can
remain, given the commonly indeterminate nature of precedent. See Evan H. Caminker,
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 10–11 (1994) (“Deciding what a precedent means will frequently depend on the
particular normative values and assumptions each judge brings to the interpretive enter-
prise.”).  At the same time, from the perspective of lower courts, the Court’s decisions
often can leave open as many questions as they resolve. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70,
76 (2006) (acknowledging that lower court conflicts “[r]eflect[ ] [a] lack of guidance from
this Court”); Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2010, at A1.  Not to be overlooked as well is the modern Court’s penchant for plurality
opinions, which can make it difficult to discern operable rules. See generally Justin
Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 933, 936 (2013).
19 Of these, Professor Paul Bator’s brief article written over three decades ago is the
most significant. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).  Even when examined, however, state court power to
differ on federal constitutional questions has been misunderstood. See, e.g., Jason Maz-
zone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 73–74 (2007) (“Today, a
single body of federal constitutional law, generated by the United States Supreme Court
through [its] power to review all state court decisions on federal constitutional issues,
means that citizens do not live with different federal constitutional rights depending on
the decisions of their state courts.”).
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stitutional questions.20  This Article redresses this deficit, using as its doctri-
nal locus federal constitutional criminal procedure, with its unique impact
on government power and individual liberty and privacy.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by providing an overview of
the growing power of state courts to interpret and apply federal constitu-
tional provisions, and then considers the important benefits of state court
involvement.  State court decisions, much like state legislative enactments
extolled by Justice Brandeis,21 provide a basis for real-world experiments to
gauge the effects of doctrine, cabined (unlike the decisions of federal cir-
cuits) to individual states.  The decisions themselves, moreover, originate in a
context that is in many ways distinct from that of federal courts.  State courts
process a massively greater number of criminal cases, affording them corre-
sponding greater experience with criminal procedure matters; they also func-
tion in a decidedly different institutional environment, including having to
stand for election.  Over the years this latter distinction has fueled the expec-
tation that state courts will reflexively endorse pro-government positions on
civil liberty questions,22 an expectation belied by the results of a survey
reported on here of state court decisions coming before the Roberts Court.
Part II examines how state courts go about operationalizing their federal
constitutional interpretive power alongside the federal circuits.  Despite
some lingering scholarly doubt on the question,23 and resistance from the
Ninth Circuit in particular,24 today the vast majority of state courts address
20 The work that has been done has failed to focus on constitutional conflict and gives
short shrift to its many important practical and theoretical ramifications. See Colin E.
Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to Applying Court of
Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 16–28
(2006); Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1999); Andrew A. Mat-
thews, Jr., Comment, The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1963);
Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 943 (1948) [hereinafter Authority in State Courts].
21 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (extolling value of social and economic legislative “experiments” undertaken
“without risk to the rest of the country”).
22 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 793, 802 (1965); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116
nn.45–46 (1977).
23 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45 n.25
(6th ed. 2002) (noting the “interesting question of the weight state courts should give to
decisions of lower federal courts when the state court is applying federal law”); Kevin M.
Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31 (2006) (“[T]he question of whether
state courts are bound by lower federal courts on the federal law’s content remains
open.”); Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1663–64 (2002)
(“The hubris of state courts that refuse to follow the definitive interpretations of federal
law made by the federal courts with jurisdiction over the state’s territory is
remarkable . . . .”).
24 See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It is the federal courts
that are the final arbiters of federal constitutional rights, not the state courts.”); Bennett v.
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federal constitutional questions free of any felt need to defer to federal cir-
cuits, including their own.25
The power-sharing arrangement gives rise to doctrinal conflicts on mul-
tiple important constitutional criminal procedure questions.  For instance,
the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit disagree on whether the
“community caretaking” doctrine can justify the warrantless entry of a home
by police,26 as do the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit.27
State and federal circuits differ on any number of other search and seizure
questions, including whether police can perform a protective “frisk” for
weapons in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the individual targeted
is engaged in criminal wrongdoing.28  Similar conflicts exist in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment contexts with respect to confessions.29
The conflicts create an array of significant difficulties.  Perhaps most
notably, basic rule of law expectations are undercut when national constitu-
tional law is permitted to depend on the uniform worn by law enforcement
agents or the court in which a criminal case is filed.  While state constitu-
tional norms can and do vary, here the divergent doctrinal positions emanate
from the same legal source, the U.S. Constitution, which controls regardless
of the government actor or court30 and which citizens accept as the national
Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]tate courts will not be the final arbiters of
important issues under the federal constitution . . . .” (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co.,
309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))).  Notably, the circuit has persisted in its position despite a prior
chastening by the Supreme Court. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 58 n.11 (1997) (terming the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion of state court subservience
“remarkable”).
25 See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098 (2013) (noting that “the views of
the federal courts of appeals do not bind the California Supreme Court when it decides a
federal constitutional question”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but
neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state
court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”).
26 Compare United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993) (disallowing
warrantless entry of home based on the community caretaking rationale), with People v.
Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 938 (Cal. 1999) (allowing warrantless entry), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187
(2000).
27 Compare United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208–09 (7th Cir. 1982) (disallowing
warrantless entry), with State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Wis. 2010) (allowing war-
rantless entry), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
28 Compare United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing frisk
in the absence of lawful seizure), with State v. Serna, 431 P.3d 406, 410 (Ariz. 2014)
(expressly rejecting the Ninth Circuit position); compare United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d
524, 528 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that in a consensual encounter “an officer may not con-
duct [a] protective search for purposes of safety until he has a reasonable suspicion [of
criminal activity]”), with Bailey v. State, 987 A.2d 72, 83 (Md. 2010) (explaining that an
“articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity [is] afoot” is not necessary in order to
conduct a protective pat-down search during a consensual encounter).
29 See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
30 See O’Connor, supra note 12, at 4 (positing that “a single sovereign’s laws should be
applied equally to all”).
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civic norm.31  When this occurs, individual rights and the scope of govern-
ment power are left to happenstance, calling into question basic expectations
of governmental consistency and even-handedness.  The variable rights
regime, in turn, creates the risk of forum shopping as prosecutors strategi-
cally gravitate toward more prosecution-friendly doctrines.
Conflicts also affect civil rights litigation.  For instance, when a state
court and its coordinate federal circuit court disagree on whether a particu-
lar law enforcement actor (e.g., a county sheriff) qualifies as a state agent,
triggering Eleventh Amendment immunity, the forum-filing decisions of
plaintiffs (not prosecutors) are affected.  By the same token, when a court
adopts a more rights-restrictive position, law enforcement will enjoy qualified
immunity, resulting in a right recognized by the other court going
unenforced.
Ultimately, the conflicts themselves, in the wake of very significant limits
placed on the scope of federal habeas corpus review,32 can only be mediated
by the nation’s “one supreme Court.”33  While lower courts beseech the
Supreme Court to resolve issues,34 multiple intrastate conflicts exist as the
Court contents itself with resolving only eighty or so cases a Term,35 a vastly
diminished docket by historical standards.36  This is so despite the fact that
the Justices continue to insist upon the importance of uniformity,37 and the
reality that the Court’s own rules provide that state-federal conflict qualifies
31 See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 (2005) (noting that
“[w]hen Americans speak of ‘constitutional law,’ they invariably mean the U.S. Constitu-
tion”); Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against
States?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1996) (observing that when Americans speak
of “rights” they refer to those embodied in the Federal Bill of Rights).
32 See infra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
34 See, e.g., Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 87 P.3d 1, 21 (Cal. 2004) (noting a dispute with
Ninth Circuit on whether a sheriff is a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and urging the
Supreme Court to “decide which view is correct” because the split “effectively drives . . .
actions against a county sheriff out of our court system and into federal court”); Feis v.
King Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 267 P.3d 1022, 1033 n.13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (noting the
prior denial of a certiorari petition to resolve an ongoing split on whether the community
caretaking exception extends to home entries by police), review denied, 277 P.3d 669
(Wash. 2012).
35 The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 416 (2013) (noting that the
Court granted certiorari in 83 cases on its appellate docket, and granted 1.2% of petitions
filed overall).
36 See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1251 (2012) (stating that “the Court hears fewer cases these
days than any other time in [its] modern history” and providing data in support); Kenneth
W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006) (noting that we are witnessing “[t]he great disappearing
merits docket”).
37 See, e.g., Justices in Their Own Words: Granting Certiorari (C-SPAN television broadcast
June 19, 2009), http://supremecourt.c-span.org/Video/JusticeOwnWords.aspx (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2014) (Chief Justice John Roberts) (“Our main job is to try to make sure
[that] federal law is uniform across the country.”).
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as a “compelling reason[ ]” to grant certiorari.38  Meanwhile, in the handful
of cases that it agrees to hear, the Court blithely elides the reality of intrastate
conflicts, electing instead to note only the existence of federal circuit splits or
discord on a question more generally.39
Part III canvasses the reform proposals advanced to date designed to
mediate state-federal constitutional conflict.  Finding each wanting, Part IV
offers an alternative, one hiding in plain view: amendment of the federal
certification provision.40  Although federal courts have enjoyed authority
since 1802 to certify disputed questions to the Supreme Court for resolution,
Congress has never extended such authority to state courts.  Expanding certi-
fication to include state and federal courts alike would have several impor-
tant benefits.  In addition to ensuring the speedy resolution of intrastate
constitutional conflicts, and curing the serious problems that they create, the
expansion will elevate state courts to their rightful place in federal constitu-
tional discourse.  It will also help pave the way for a more engaged relation-
ship between state and lower federal courts and the Supreme Court charged
with overseeing their work and ensuring federal constitutional consistency.
I. STATE COURT AUTHORITY AND ITS BENEFITS
A. Historical Evolution
State courts have long played a role in federal constitutional litigation.
Their authority to decide federal constitutional questions, however, arises
chiefly on an inferential basis: Article III speaks only of “one supreme Court,”
and fails to require creation of lower federal courts,41 leaving state courts by
default as decisionmakers.42  Lower federal courts, created by Congress
38 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(c).
39 See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1131 & n.4 (2014) (noting only
that the California court agreed with a “majority of the federal circuits” while ignoring that
the court’s position conflicted with the position adopted by the Ninth Circuit); Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing a “chorus . . . includ[ing] courts, scholars, and
Members of this Court” calling for its prior decision in New York v. Belton to be revisited, yet
ignoring that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision limiting Belton created a conflict with
the Ninth Circuit); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 (2006) (referring only to a
“split of authority” on whether police can enter a home when a physically present co-occu-
pant objects, failing to note the conflict in question between the Georgia Supreme Court
and the Eleventh Circuit).
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).
42 See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 211 (1971) (noting that lower federal courts
were not needed because state courts were regarded as “adequate”); see also Matthew I.
Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1263 (2011); James E. Pfander, Federal
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 216–17 (2007).
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shortly after the nation’s founding,43 did not come to enjoy general federal
question jurisdiction until 1875.44
Even though the Judiciary Act of 1789 signaled a degree of mistrust of
state courts,45 and despite concerns expressed over their skill and trustwor-
thiness,46 state courts figured centrally in the nation’s early constitutional
life.47  While Barron v. Baltimore made clear that state and local governments
were not subject to the Federal Bill of Rights,48 antebellum state courts regu-
larly engaged in federal constitutional common lawmaking on their own ini-
tiative.49  As Professor Jason Mazzone has observed, “[i]n a series of cases that
are largely forgotten or brushed aside today, early state courts regularly did
43 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 3–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75. On what has come to be
known as the Madisonian Compromise, leaving to Congress authority to create lower fed-
eral courts, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7–9 (5th ed. 2003).
44 See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 246–47 & n.8 (1967) (noting the same, based on
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470); see also Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse
Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26
LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (“In the general constitutional order of the early republic,
the lower federal courts played but a peripheral role in an era dominated by the ascen-
dancy of the common law and state judiciaries.”).
45 The Act empowered the Supreme Court to review by writ of error any decision in
which a state court denied a federal right, title, or interest, which as Professor James
Pfander has noted “doubtless reflected some distrust of the state courts.”  Pfander, supra
note 42, at 232.  Based on authority granted in Article III, section 2, the Act similarly
granted the federal judiciary diversity jurisdiction in civil cases, affording federal courts
power to adjudicate claims brought by citizens of different states or non-U.S. citizens. See
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 509 (1928).
46 Alexander Hamilton, for instance, expressed concern that state courts would fail to
consider national interests because of “local views and prejudices” and “look with peculiar
deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence.” THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 22, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  As Brian Fitzpatrick has
noted, however, Hamilton was also prone to lavishing state courts with praise for their
independence and competence. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L.
REV. 839, 874–75 (2012).  Likewise, Judge Friendly’s survey of Framing-era state cases sug-
gests that diversity jurisdiction was motivated not so much by fear of state judicial prejudice
but rather worry over state legislatures.  Friendly, supra note 45, at 495–97; see also Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816) (Story, J.) (“[T]he judges of the state
courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as those of the
courts of the United States . . . .”).
47 See Pfander, supra note 42, at 209, 218–19.
48 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 250–51 (1833) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction a Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause claim against the City of Baltimore).
49 See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979,
990 (2010) (“[S]tate courts understood the Bill either to apply directly to state govern-
ments or to set out general constitutional principles that bound the states, even when their
own constitutions imposed no such constraint.”); see also Mazzone, supra note 19, at 3
(“Barron simply affirmed the unremarkable proposition that the federal courts would not
apply the Bill of Rights to constrain state government.  Both before and after Barron . . .
state courts were free to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.”).
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apply the Federal Bill of Rights to invalidate state laws and otherwise con-
strain state government.”50  State courts, Professor Mazzone notes, served as
“an important mechanism for protecting individual rights in the antebellum
era.”51
State courts, moreover, long enjoyed a considerable degree of decisional
autonomy.  For much of the nation’s history, the Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction only over state cases that rejected federal constitutional claims.52
It was not until 1914 that Congress, concerned over what Professors Frank-
furter and Landis termed “a wide-spread feeling that, in practice, constitu-
tionality turned on geography,”53 extended to the Court full jurisdiction over
state courts, authorizing review of their decisions that allowed (not merely
rejected) federal constitutional claims and defenses.54
In addition, due to the slow emergence of habeas corpus authority, state
courts operated free of lower federal court oversight.  The latter did not
come to have habeas review authority over state criminal cases until after the
Civil War, and then only with respect to the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.55  Not until 1953 were lower federal courts empowered to review the
validity of state court convictions implicating federal constitutional claims.56
Over time, state courts have come to play an ever-greater role in federal
constitutional litigation.57  Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the
Supreme Court, through gradual application of the incorporation doc-
50 Mazzone, supra note 19, at 3; see also Mazzone, supra note 49, at 985–90 (surveying
state cases).
51 Mazzone, supra note 19, at 23.  For discussion of early state cases focusing on the
Fourth Amendment and police search and seizure practices in particular, see BRADFORD P.
WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 31–33, 116–17 (1986).
52 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85, 85–87.  Further testament to state
authority, in 1830 Congress considered (but did not approve) eliminating Supreme Court
review of state court decisions. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 159 (1960).  According to the bill’s
sponsor, Senator William Jenner:
There is no need for any national uniformity with respect to these matters.  They
are things for each State to decide for itself.  Leaving the decisions in each State
to the highest court of the State, and taking from the Supreme Court . . . any
power to step in and impose an arbitrary rule, can only be a salutary thing . . . .
Id. at 159 n.11 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 195
(1928).
54 Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
55 See MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS 120 (1999).
56 Id. (noting and discussing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)).
57 The major role played by state courts has not been without controversy, however.  It
has been asserted, for instance, that state court involvement only made sense before 1875,
when the number and role of lower federal courts significantly expanded. See Samuel P.
Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1789 (2012) (asserting that “the Madis-
onian Compromise grew out of uncertainty that has been resolved definitively for more
than a century”).  Lack of confidence in the even-handedness of states more generally of
course also figured centrally in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986) (arguing that the Fourteenth
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-DEC-14 14:43
244 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
trine,58 formally subjected states to the criminal procedure provisions of the
Bill of Rights.59  Acting on this authority, state courts have since left an indeli-
ble mark,60 as the multiple state cases resulting in landmark criminal proce-
dure precedents from the Warren Court61 through the Roberts Court62
attest.
As discussed next, moreover, state court participation in the evolution of
federal constitutional criminal procedure doctrine has a variety of important
functional benefits.
B. The Functional Benefits of State Court Power
1. Experimentation
Invoking Justice Brandeis’s ideal,63 it has long been asserted that the
independent decisionmaking authority of the nation’s regionally arrayed
twelve federal circuit courts afford experimentalist benefit.64  If one accepts
Amendment was intended to prevent states from violating rights contained in the Bill of
Rights).
58 See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
59 The influx of criminal procedure cases was dramatically evidenced in state court
dockets. See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 121, 145–47 (1977) (discussing data showing massive increases in federal constitu-
tional criminal procedure matters during the study period); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court
Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131 n.7 (1986) (noting that by 1970
almost fifty percent of state supreme court criminal cases presented a federal constitutional
law question).
60 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272 (2008) (“The serial incorporation of
the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s and 1960’s imposed more constitu-
tional obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals
were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the Constitution.”).
61 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
62 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119
(2000); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366
(1993); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
(1990); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987);
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).  While such consti-
tutionally formative cases have usually come from state supreme courts, state intermediate
courts have also been an important originating source over the years. See, e.g., Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
63 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
64 See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 81 (1981) (“[T]he quest for uniformity contains room for regional experimenta-
tion and adaptation of national law to continental diversity.”).
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that constitutional rights are ripe for experimentation,65 a case can be made
for the experimental role of state courts as well.66  Their decisions, like those
of federal courts, are publicly available and critiqued,67 and their real-world
effects can be measured and assessed.  Indeed, it can be said that state court
decisions better fulfill the Brandeisian ideal.  This is because unlike circuit
decisions, which impact several states,68 the effects of state decisions are
cabined to a single state, as Justice Brandeis would have it,69 optimizing con-
ditions for natural constitutional experiments.70
65 But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“I
have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States should be able to experi-
ment with the protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of Rights.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[W]hile I quite agree
with Mr. Justice Brandeis . . . I do not believe that this includes the power to experiment
with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . . I cannot agree that the Constitution grants
such power either to the States or to the Federal Government.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitu-
tion was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental
rights of the individual.”).
66 As the Ohio Supreme Court observed,
[W]e are reluctant to abandon our role in the system of federalism created by the
United States Constitution until the United States Supreme Court directs us oth-
erwise.  Both inferior federal courts and state courts serve as “laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear.”
State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also William W. Schwarzer et al., Judi-
cial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV.
1689, 1746 (1992) (extolling the “value of fifty laboratories in which approaches to federal
law can be tested”).
67 While Justice Brandeis had state legislatures in mind, Professors Marc Miller and
Ronald Wright have persuasively argued that the laboratory trope is especially apt in the
context of state caselaw:
Active state interpretations and responses to federal constitutional decisions are a
form of logical and institutional testing and experimentation.  They are closer to
the laboratory metaphor than many state initiatives that are not articulated, since
these judicial experiments are published and subject to various forms of criticism
and review, including potential review by federal courts.
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional Limits,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 258 (2008).
68 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3, at 11
(7th ed. 2011) (describing the multi-state composition of federal regional circuits).  In
addition to affecting several states, circuit caselaw can affect outcomes in other circuits, by
choice-of-law application, and even federal administrative proceedings (such as immigra-
tion).  Logan, supra note 9, at 1163 & n.162.
69 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (extolling the value of “experiments” undertaken “without risk to the rest of the
country”).
70 In addition, under such circumstances it is conceivable that a Tieboutian sorting
benefit can accrue, as state residents can “vote with their feet” in pursuit of preferable
positions adopted elsewhere. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION
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2. State “Voice”
A second major benefit concerns the unique perspective state courts
bring to the job of federal constitutional interpretation and application.
State courts not only have been engaged in constitutional interpretation for a
far longer time than lower federal courts,71 they also process an exponen-
tially higher volume of criminal cases than federal courts,72 affording them
corresponding greater experience in the resolution of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure questions.73
State courts, moreover, operate within an institutional context that very
often differs from their federal judicial counterparts.74  The difference is
such that, to the extent that judicial decisionmaking is animated by what
political scientists refer to as “team theory,”75 state courts operate from the
perspective of a distinctly different team.76
Finally, unlike life-tenured federal judges, state judges most often stand
for election,77 providing what Professor David Pozen has called a “systematic
127–29 (2000) (discussing local government competition and its possible consequences);
Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 329, 332 (2003).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 41–51; see also SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DIS-
TINCT JUDICIAL POWER 243 (2011) (noting that state courts exercised their power of judicial
review in the Founding era whereas federal courts did not do so until later in the 1800s).
72 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234184, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, at 17 tbl. 14 (Dec.
2011) (noting that nationwide state and local law enforcement account for 99% of all
arrests and 94% of felony convictions).
73 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting the
“unique vantage point” state courts have in automobile stop cases); see also Shirley S. Abra-
hamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1148–49 (1985) (“The sheer number of state criminal cases . . . means
that the state courts have many opportunities to rule on both federal and state constitu-
tional issues.”).
74 See Miller & Wright, supra note 67, at 254 (“[S]tate supreme courts . . . are not
‘lower courts’ . . . . They do not have the same obligations as members of a unified [fed-
eral] judiciary.  State high courts sit atop their own culture . . . and [operate within] a
different social reality that exerts some gravitational pull on the meaning of legal require-
ments.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal
Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 659 (2000) (“Unlike federal courts, state courts
generally do defer to the constitutional judgments of other branches of government.”).
States do of course differ in the nature and extent of their inter-branch interactions. See
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in
Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1059–75 (1991) (describing variations among
states with regard to inter-branch interaction).
75 Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 798 (2009).
76 See id. at 801.
77 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 489 (2012) (noting that approximately 90% of state
trial and appellate judges face election of some kind); Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker,
Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 462 (2010) (noting that
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and pervasive mechanism for popular constitutionalism.”78  “The brute fact
of having to face the voters,” as Professors Bruhl and Leib recently noted,
“gives elected judges a strong motivation to understand how the public will
receive their rulings.”79  Many state judges, moreover, have themselves previ-
ously served as elected officials, which supplies a degree of “political savvy
and comprehension.”80
The political responsiveness of state courts has of course long dominated
discourse concerning their institutional competence to decide federal consti-
tutional questions.  Alexander Hamilton expressed the fear that state courts
would be less likely to give full scope to federal rights that are unpopular
locally,81 a view echoed many decades later in Professor Neuborne’s classic
article The Myth of Parity.82
Such political pressures would logically have quite significant impact in
the criminal procedure realm given the common unpopularity of extending
rights to criminal defendants.83  Adopting a right-restrictive position might
also be seen as the “safest” position in the face of jurisprudential uncer-
tainty,84 and adopting a right-restrictive position at variance with the federal
state supreme court justices are subject to election of some kind in at least thirty-nine
states).
78 David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2050 (2010).
79 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1250 (2012); see also Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Coun-
tering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 731–40 (2010) (surveying empirical
work suggesting that state judges are more inclined to decide cases in line with popular
opinion).
80 Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1250.
81 See supra note 46.  As also noted, however, Hamilton was prone to praise state courts
for their independence and competence. See supra note 46.
82 See Neuborne, supra note 22, at 1131 (“[T]he only judicial forums . . . capable of
enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective manner are the federal
courts . . . .”); see also A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS, Commentary, General Diversity Jurisdiction, at 41 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1963)) (surveying sources maintaining that “provincialism” and “local spirit” impede
extension of federal rights in state courts); Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 802 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 429 (Warner ed. 1818) (Alexander Hamilton)); Stephen P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689
(1995) (asserting that elected state judiciaries are prone to institutional bias against crimi-
nal defendants).
83 See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2068 (2006); see also Devins & Man-
sker, supra note 77, at 476–77 (noting that with the exception of criminal justice, and a few
select other issue areas, “there is little reason to think that the public is aware of state
supreme court decision making”).
84 A sentiment exemplified by Illinois Court of Appeals Judge Robert English, who in
the Warren Court era wrote:
I should not want to participate in the release of a convicted defendant on the
basis of what the Supreme Court of the United States might do in the circum-
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judiciary could bolster support among state voters (such as in the desegrega-
tion-era South).85
Research, however, has not borne out the premise that state courts are
reflexively hostile to federal constitutional criminal procedure rights.86  His-
torically, this does not appear to be the case,87 nor does it seem so based on
the author’s examination of Roberts Court cases reviewing state court crimi-
nal procedure decisions.88  Cases decided in an eight-year period (October
Term 2005 to October Term 2012) highlight the varied positions adopted by
state courts.89  Not surprisingly, state courts often adopted right-limiting posi-
tions, at times resulting in reversal,90 but more often affirmance by the
Court.91  Yet, much as during the Warren Court era, when state courts were
stances were such a case to be presented to it, and then find out later that the
Court was disinclined to go quite that far.
Robert E. English, Lawyers in the Station House?, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
283, 283 (1966).
85 See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 55, at 35; John C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin,
Jr., Policy Convergence in a Federal Judicial System: The Application of Intensified Scrutiny Doctrines
by State Supreme Courts, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 131 (1997); see also Bruhl & Leib, supra note
79, at 1272 (“[I]t is hard to believe that an elected judge primed to respond to constitu-
ents’ views would ignore those views just because federal law is at issue.”).
86 Cf. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and
Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 233, 283–85 (1999) (surveying Takings Clause cases and concluding that little
variation exists in receptivity to claims in state and federal court); William B. Rubenstein,
The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599 (1999) (surveying state cases and
concluding that “gay litigants seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have generally
fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts”).
87 See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 55, at 50–54; Cf. James S. Liebman et al., Capital
Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1855 (2000) (noting
that despite the common belief that federal judges are more likely to overturn capital cases
than elected state judges, the latter accounted for 90% of cases overturned during study
period, prompting the study’s authors to conclude that “state judges are the first and most
important line of defense against erroneous death sentences”).
88 The survey consisted of cases collectively drawn from the SCOTUS Blog and the
BNA Reporter.
89 The survey examined cases coming to the Court by direct appeal from a state court,
§ 1983, and state post-conviction.  It omitted federal habeas cases because the standard of
federal review is so undemanding. See infra text accompanying notes 242–45; see also Ren-
ico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 n.3 (2010) (stating that “whether the [state court] was right or
wrong is not the pertinent question under the [Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996]”).
90 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (reversing North
Carolina Supreme Court’s holding that a child’s age, when known or reasonably known by
police, does not warrant consideration in Miranda custody analysis); Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007) (reversing the California Supreme Court’s holding that a traffic
stop does not result in the seizure of a passenger).
91 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (affirming the New
Hampshire Supreme Court’s holding that eyewitness identification satisfies due process
unless suggestive circumstances are arranged by police); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
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often more protective of federal rights than lower federal courts,92 and the
Burger Court era,93 when the Justices felt obliged to caution them against
overenforcement,94 state courts staked out pro-defense positions.  In several
such instances, the Roberts Court reversed,95 even chiding them for their
perceived excesses.96
However, there were also several notable instances in which the Court
affirmed (and applied nationwide) a right-protective position adopted by a
state court.97  For instance, in Georgia v. Randolph, the Court backed the deci-
586, 602 (2006) (affirming a Michigan Court of Appeals holding that police violation of
“knock and announce” requirement does not trigger the exclusionary rule).
92 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1251–53 (1978); see also, e.g., Barnes v. State, 130 N.W.2d
264, 269 (Wis. 1964) (foreshadowing the position adopted by the Court in Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332 (2009), rejecting a police search incident to arrest authority based on a traffic
violation arrest because no fruits tied to the arrest basis likely would be found).
93 See J. Skelly Wright, Jr., In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 181–83 (1984).
94 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State may not impose such
greater restrictions [on police behavior] as a matter of federal constitutional law when this
Court specifically refrains from imposing them.” (emphasis omitted)).
95 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (reversing a Maryland Court
of Appeals holding that barred warrantless DNA swabs of arrestees); Kentucky v. King, 131
S. Ct. 1849, 1862–63 (2011) (reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court and holding that
police could “create an exigency” to enter a home so long as they act in a manner consis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 64 (2010) (reversing a
Florida Supreme Court decision requiring that a Miranda warning contain express advice
of defendant’s entitlement to “presence” of counsel); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178
(2008) (reversing a Virginia Supreme Court holding that a violation of state law limiting
arrest authority violated the Fourth Amendment); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
406–07 (2006) (reversing a Utah Supreme Court holding that warrantless entry of home by
police, based on emergency, must be motivated solely by a non-law enforcement function).
96 See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013) (reversing, by a 9–0 vote, the
Florida Supreme Court, which “flouted” established law on probable cause analysis).  For a
pre–Roberts Court example, see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).  In Sullivan,
which concerned application of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), holding that an
officer’s pretextual subjective motivation for making a stop is irrelevant so long as the facts
objectively support a lawful basis, the Arkansas Supreme Court asserted that “there is noth-
ing that prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more rights.” Sullivan, 532
U.S. at 771 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, stating that the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s position was “flatly contrary to [the] Court’s controlling prece-
dent.” Id.  And, in a fit of seeming passive aggressiveness, it offered that the state court’s
belief that it could “provide greater protection than this Court’s own federal constitutional
precedents provide . . . surely must be an inadvertent error.” Id. at 772 (citing Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 & n.4 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Affirmances of state court constitutional criminal procedure decisions, it should be
noted, are themselves historically uncommon. See John C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin,
Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Review of State High Court Decisions from the Warren Through the Rehn-
quist Courts, 89 JUDICATURE 146, 148 (2005) (noting that on average the Warren, Burger,
and Rehnquist Courts affirmed only 30% of state decisions).  The Court as a general mat-
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sion of the Georgia Supreme Court that consent to enter a shared residence
is invalid if a physically present resident objects.98  At the time, no federal
court had so held, and the Georgia Supreme Court stood almost alone (shar-
ing company with only the supreme courts of Florida, Minnesota and Wash-
ington).99  Similarly, in Arizona v. Gant,100 the Supreme Court affirmed the
Arizona Supreme Court’s outlier position, both nationally and vis-a`-vis the
Ninth Circuit,101 limiting police authority to search vehicles incident to
arrest.102  And, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court backed the Florida Supreme
Court’s position that police use of a drug-detection dog to sniff the exterior
of a home constituted a search, triggering Fourth Amendment protec-
tion103—a position rejected by the vast majority of state and almost all fed-
eral circuit courts.104
In short, far from constituting “needless conflict between state and fed-
eral courts,”105 the varied doctrinal positions adopted by state and lower fed-
eral courts serve as essential grist in the ongoing exposition of the nation’s
Constitution.106  Moreover, affording states in particular—sovereigns whose
“dignity” is thought worthy of respect107—a chance to be involved in the
making of national constitutional law has a federalism-enforcing benefit.  It
allows buy-in, affording an avenue for what Professor Paul Bator termed
“membership” in the nation’s “cooperative moral and legal community.”108
ter is far more prone to reverse than affirm. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM 271 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that in recent years the Court reverses 70–75% of
cases argued).
98 547 U.S. 103, 121–22 (2006).
99 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S 103 (2006)
(No. 04-1067), 2005 WL 309364, at *5 (citing Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977); In re
D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. 1992); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989)).
100 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
101 See State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 645 (Ariz. 2007) (noting that “most other courts”
would allow search), aff’d, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
102 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (allowing search only if the arrestee is within reaching dis-
tance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence sup-
porting basis for arrest).
103 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013).
104 Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 66–68 & nn.15–16 (Fla. 2011) (Polston, J.,
dissenting).
105 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–58 (1961) (“‘[T]he very essence of a healthy
federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal
courts.’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960))).
106 See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2012) (emphasizing the judiciary’s contributory role in creating the “framework
of public norms”).
107 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552
U.S. 264, 280 (2008) (“States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority . . . .”).
108 Bator, supra note 19, at 635; see also Authority in State Courts, supra note 20, at 948
(explaining that state court “freedom to make their own decisions will eliminate any latent
sentiment in the state courts that national law is in some way foreign to them”).
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II. PRAXIS AND PROBLEMS
The story of state court empowerment just recounted, however, yields
only a partial picture of the true significance of state court authority.  This
added significance comes into focus when one takes account of a key struc-
tural fact, noted at the outset: the authority of state courts to reject the consti-
tutional positions of federal circuit courts, including those of the circuit in
which they are located.109  This Part surveys how state courts go about exer-
cising their constitutional autonomy and then discusses the practical
problems that arise when state courts and their coordinate federal circuits
disagree.
A. State Approaches
While in the past state courts often felt obliged to defer to the federal
constitutional decisions of federal circuits,110 today at least forty-six states and
the District of Columbia regard such decisions as non-binding and worthy of
at most persuasive precedential weight.111  Typically, the courts assert their
position in blanket, unequivocal terms.112  As the Montana Supreme Court
flatly stated a decade ago, “[t]he Supremacy Clause does not require state
courts to follow precedent from the circuit courts of appeal interpreting the
United States Constitution.”113  And, while state courts at times voice a mea-
sure of greater receptivity to their own circuit’s precedent,114 others pay it
109 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Hare, 134 P. 713, 714 (Cal. 1913) (noting that state courts are
“bound by the interpretation put upon [the Constitution] by the courts of the United
States”); People v. Wolfe, 147 N.W.2d 447, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (“The standards in
the federal cases control so far as the states are concerned, as a result of Mapp v. Ohio.”
(citation omitted)); see also Annotation, Duty of State Courts to Follow Decisions of Federal
Courts, Other than the Supreme Court, on Federal Questions, 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943) (surveying
state caselaw); Authority in State Courts, supra note 20, at 944 (“[S]tate courts have widely
disagreed as to the binding effect of such decisions when made by the lower federal
courts.”).
111 See infra Appendix.  Seemingly, only Delaware has adopted a policy of deference.
See infra Appendix.  In three states (Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming) it is difficult to specify a
position with any degree of certainty. See infra Appendix.
112 See, e.g., State v. Sansing, 77 P.3d 30, 33 n.2 (Ariz. 2003) (“We are not bound by the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what the Constitution requires.”); People v. Williams, 641
N.E.2d 296, 321 (Ill. 1994) (“[D]ecisions of lower Federal courts on Federal constitutional
questions are not binding on State courts.”); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1279 (La.
1994) (“[L]ower federal court decisions do not bind this court’s interpretations of federal
constitutional law.”); Strouth v. State, 999 S.W.2d 759, 765 n.9 (Tenn. 1999) (explaining
that a state court is “not bound by decisions of the federal district and circuit courts”);
State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wis. 1993) (“It is clear . . . that determinations on
federal questions by either the federal circuit courts of appeal or the federal district courts
are not binding upon state courts.”).
113 State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003).
114 See State v. Smith, 881 A.2d 160, 181 n.15 (Conn. 2005) (deeming Second Circuit
“particularly persuasive”); Holloway v. United States, 951 A.2d 59, 63 (D.C. 2008) (deem-
ing the D.C. Circuit “highly persuasive” (citation omitted)); State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d
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little more than lip service115 or flatly reject that circuit dominion is
relevant.116
The growth in state court autonomy signals an important shift in the
nation’s judiciary, one underscored by the work of social scientists examining
state-federal court relations.  Professor Laurence Benner and his colleagues,
for instance, in reviewing state court cases decided from 1915 to 1936 regard-
ing whether to adopt the federal exclusionary rule (mandated by Weeks v.
United States),117 discovered a distinct circuit-centrism.118  They found that
decisions adopting the exclusionary rule by other state courts located in the
same federal circuit were key, having more influence than courts in a neigh-
boring state or states situated in the same West reporter or census region.119
Building on prior research detecting a similar influence,120 the authors
attributed the outcome to the enhanced communication within and influ-
ence of federal circuits.121  The findings reported here suggest operation of a
far less pronounced federal circuit court impact.
At least as interesting is the contrast the findings have with the way state
courts handle interpretation of their own state constitutions.  Although
enjoying the undisputed right to interpret their constitutions as they see fit,
state courts very often interpret their constitutions in a manner that is in
“lockstep” with the Supreme Court.122  The asymmetry allows for some curi-
1160, 1163 (Me. 1986) (deferring to the First Circuit “so far as reasonably possible”); Phil-
lips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1989) (finding the Tenth Circuit “highly
persuasive”).
115 The Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, affords Sixth Circuit caselaw only “some
persuasive weight.”  State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001).
116 See, e.g., Macias v. Cnty. of L.A., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 371 n.5 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]e
accord the decisions of the Ninth Circuit no greater weight than those of other circuits.”);
Feis v. King Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 267 P.3d 1022, 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), review denied,
277 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2012) (“‘[T]he geographical location of the court issuing the opinion
is of no moment. . . . We have never held that an opinion from the Ninth Circuit is more or
less persuasive than, for example, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, or Tenth Circuits.’”
(quoting S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 733 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008))).
117 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
118 See Laurence A. Benner et al., Social-Network Theory and the Diffusion of the Search-and-
Seizure Exclusionary Rule Among State Courts Between Weeks and Wolf, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 97
(2012).
119 Id. at 106.
120 See Robert C. Bird & Donald J. Smythe, The Structure of American Legal Institutions and
the Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978–1999, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833 (2008); Robert
A. Carp, The Scope and Function of Intra-Circuit Judicial Communication: A Case Study of the
Eighth Circuit, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 405 (1972); Ronald Stidham & Robert A. Carp, Exploring
Regionalism in the Federal District Courts, 18 PUBLIUS 113 (1988).
121 Benner et al., supra note 118, at 136; see also id. at 139 (“[A] state supreme-court
decision from another jurisdiction that adopted the rule appeared to be more persuasive if
that state was within the same federal circuit as the state considering such adoption.”).
122 See generally Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure
Cases, 77 MISS. L.J. 225, 249–51 (2007).  And even when professing to undertake indepen-
dent constitutional interpretation, state courts very often really do so in name only, engag-
ing in what one commentator has termed “counterfeit” analysis.  Francis Barry McCarthy,
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ous outcomes.  In California, for example, state courts defer to federal wis-
dom (from the U.S. Supreme Court) on how to interpret their state
constitution,123 yet disregard lower federal court wisdom when it comes to
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.124  Although Supreme Court decisions
obviously bear greater precedential weight than those of lower federal courts,
the ready resistance of California courts to their lower federal counterparts
on federal constitutional questions is nonetheless noteworthy.125 Whether it
to some degree perhaps reflects a tit-for-tat institutional response based on
rejection of one another’s decisions more generally,126 or offense taken at
the common federal disregard of state constitutional doctrine (from the
Supreme Court on down),127 is a provocative question to ponder.
Finally, it should not go unmentioned that state court autonomy is selec-
tive; it does not extend to all federal legal questions.  Although states typically
ignore lower federal court wisdom on federal constitutional questions, they
often defer to federal courts on the interpretation of federal statutes.  Illi-
nois, for instance, gives “considerable weight” to and finds “highly persua-
sive” federal court interpretations of federal statutes, but goes its own way on
constitutional questions.128  Deference is needed “in the interest of preserv-
ing unity” because “uniformity of decision is an important consideration
when state courts interpret federal statutes.”129
Counterfeit Interpretations of State Constitutions in Criminal Procedure, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79
passim (2008).
123 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
761, 790 (1992).
124 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 299 P.3d 1185, 1214 (Cal. 2013) (“[D]ecisions by the
federal courts of appeal are not binding on us.”); People v. Gray, 118 P.3d 496, 536 (Cal.
2005) (“We are, of course, not bound by the decisions of lower federal courts.”).
125 See, e.g., Williams, 299 P.3d at 1214.
126 See, e.g., Ruth A. Moyer, Why and How a Lower Federal Court’s Decision That a Search or
Seizure Violated the Fourth Amendment Should Be Binding in a State Prosecution: Using “Good
Sense” and Suppressing Unnecessary Formalism, 36 VT. L. REV. 165, 206 (2011) (suggesting that
such a sentiment is operable when, in instances of successive prosecutions, state and fed-
eral courts disregard one another’s prior suppression decisions).
127 See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
323, 346 (2011) (“State courts appear to be holding up their end of th[e] arrangement
(perhaps with too much enthusiasm) by borrowing heavily from federal doctrine.  Federal
courts, on the other hand, generally are not.”).
128 Compare State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc., 984 N.E.2d 449, 458–59 (Ill.
2013) (deferring to lower federal courts when the courts agree on interpretation of a fed-
eral statute), with People v. Brisbon, 544 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ill. 1989) (rejecting deference to
federal courts on federal constitutional questions).
129 State Bank of Cherry, 984 N.E.2d at 459; see also Weatherford v. State, 81 P.3d 320, 324
(Ariz. 2003) (en banc) (stating that deferring on federal statutory interpretation questions
“furthers federal-state . . . relations[ ]”); NRDC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 832 N.W.2d 288,
295 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (“Unless there is a conflict among federal courts [on the statu-
tory question], this Court is bound by the holdings of federal courts on federal ques-
tions.”).  State court deference to federal lower court wisdom is also seen in the context of
maritime law. See Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Cox, 137 So. 3d 1157, 1161 (Fla. Dist.
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The reason for the dichotomy has gone unstated but might rest on the
logic that federal statutory law, unlike federal constitutional law, is the handi-
work of Congress, and state courts should therefore defer much as federal
courts defer to state court interpretations of state substantive law under Erie
v. Tompkins Railroad.130  Yet, even if this is correct, it remains unclear why the
practical effect of disuniformity should warrant special concern with federal
statutory but not constitutional law,131 when if anything the converse should
be the case.132
B. The Conflicts and Their Consequences
When operationalized, state and lower federal court power to disagree
gives rise to a considerable number of intrastate criminal procedure conflicts.
With respect to Fourth Amendment limits on the search authority of police,
conflicts exist on such basic questions as what qualifies as a “search”133 and
whether the Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Gant,134 limiting police
authority to search a car’s interior when an arrestee has been secured,
extends to the non-auto context.135  Conflicts also exist on whether police
can:
• conduct a warrantless safety “sweep” of a home in situations other
than when an in-home arrest occurs136
Ct. App. 2014) (noting that although it was not bound by federal lower court decisions the
federal interest in “harmony” and “uniformity” in maritime law dictates deference).
130 See Clermont, supra note 23, at 31 (“In both the Erie setting and the reverse-Erie
setting, the court’s job is to apply the other sovereign’s law, not to create law for it.”); Omar
K. Madhany, Comment, Towards a Unified Theory of “Reverse-Erie,” 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1261,
1299 (2014) (positing that federal courts are best situated to divine federal congressional
intent).
131 Except of course when Congress explicitly seeks uniformity in the interpretation
and application of its statutes. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211
(1985) (noting the need for interpretive uniformity in the interpretation of collective bar-
gaining agreements in litigation brought under the Federal Labor Management Relations
Act).
132 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
133 Compare United States v. $277,000 U.S. Currency, 941 F.2d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that police performed a search by removing a tarp covering a truck in the backy-
ard of a residence), with State v. Allen, 166 P.3d 111, 116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting
the Ninth Circuit position), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 817 (2008).
134 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
135 Compare United States v. Carter, 520 F. App’x 377, 381–82 (6th Cir. 2013)
(extending Gant), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 247 (2013), with Robbins v. Commonwealth, 336
S.W.3d 60, 64 (Ky. 2011) (declining to extend Gant); compare United States v. Perdoma,
621 F.3d 745, 751–52 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend Gant), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2446 (2011), with State v. Lussier, 770 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (extending
Gant).
136 Compare United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he principle
enunciated in Buie . . . applies with equal force to an officer left behind to secure the
premises while a warrant to search those premises is obtained.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 981
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• enter a home without a warrant based on the “community caretaking”
doctrine137 or to preserve evidence regarding an individual suspected
of driving while intoxicated138
• perform a protective frisk for weapons in a consensual encounter lack-
ing in any evidence of unlawful activity by the seized individual139
• enter a home without a warrant or probable case when acting to
address an emergency or safety concern of an inhabitant140
• search a container when, acting on consent provided by one with
apparent authority, uncertainty arises over the container’s
ownership141
(2001), with Guzman v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.3d 805, 807–08 (Ky. 2012) (holding that
under Buie an officer may only conduct a protective sweep in conjunction with a lawful
arrest); compare United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 2006) (declin-
ing to extend Buie and reaffirming its previous decisions that “‘a protective sweep may only
be performed incident to an arrest’” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 949 (2007),
with People v. Strimple, 267 P.3d 1219, 1220–21 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (upholding a
warrantless protective sweep when entry was premised on consent).
137 Compare United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993) (disallowing
warrantless entry of home based on the community caretaking doctrine), with People v.
Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 938 (Cal. 1999) (allowing warrantless entry), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187
(2000).
138 Compare Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir. 2009) (disallowing war-
rantless entry, relying on “felony/misdemeanor distinction” adopted in Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984)), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1048 (2010), with People v. Thompson, 135
P.3d 3, 9 (Cal. 2006) (allowing warrantless entry, distinguishing Welsh v. Wisconsin because
California (unlike Wisconsin) made DUIs a jailable offense).
139 Compare United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing frisk
in absence of lawful seizure), with State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (expressly
rejecting the Ninth Circuit position); compare United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528
(4th Cir. 2000) (stating that in a consensual encounter “an officer may not conduct [a]
protective search for purposes of safety until he has a reasonable suspicion [of criminal
activity]”), with Bailey v. State, 987 A.2d 72, 83 (Md. 2010) (explaining that an “articulable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity [is] afoot” is not necessary in order to conduct a
protective pat-down search during a consensual encounter).
140 Compare Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d 539, 548–49 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (declin-
ing to merge the emergency and exigent circumstances doctrines and holding that when
an officer acts in an investigatory capacity, a warrantless search is valid only with probable
cause and exigent circumstances), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct.
987 (2012), with Hannon v. State, 207 P.3d 344, 346–47 (Nev. 2009) (merging the emer-
gency and exigent circumstances doctrines and construing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398 (2006), to dispense with the probable cause requirement in an emergency or safety
situation even if officer is acting in an investigatory capacity).
141 Compare United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a
search premised on apparent authority extends to all items, including closed containers,
except those “‘obviously’ belonging to another person”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 923 (2006),
with People v. Gonzalez, 667 N.E.2d 323, 327 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that when faced with
ambiguity over ownership of a closed container, a search may not proceed without further
inquiry); compare United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) (declin-
ing to adopt the bright-line rule that ambiguity of ownership requires further inquiry prior
to a consensual search based on apparent authority), with Norris v. State, 732 N.E.2d 186,
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• enter, without a search warrant, the common area of an apartment or
other multi-dwelling unit to conduct an investigation142
• conduct a pat-down search of all companions of arrestees (the “auto-
matic companion” rule)143
• search a non-occupant visitor’s belongings pursuant to a search war-
rant for a home144
• enter a suspect’s home without probable cause to believe that the sus-
pect is at home when executing an arrest warrant.145
Fourth Amendment doctrine on the power of law enforcement to seize
individuals is marked by similar conflicts, with differences existing on
whether police can:
• stop an individual based on reasonable suspicion that they have com-
mitted a past misdemeanor (versus a past felony)146
191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[U]nder a sound application of the apparent authority rule the
police must be required to make reasonable inquiries when they find themselves in ambig-
uous circumstances.” (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(g), at 267
(2d ed. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142 Compare United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (adopting a per se
rule that the tenant of an apartment building has a per se reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy), with State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 734 (Tenn. 2010) (rejecting the Sixth Circuit
position and adopting a totality of the circumstances test), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 187
(2010).
143 Compare United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (adopting rule),
with El-Amin v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 115, 118 (Va. 2005) (noting and rejecting the
Fourth Circuit’s contrary position); compare United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498–99 (6th
Cir. 1985) (declining to adopt the rule), with Owens v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704,
709 n.23 (Ky. 2009) (noting and rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s contrary position).
144 Compare United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting a
“relationship to the premises” test), with State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014)
(rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach and adopting a “possession” test, allowing police to
search the personal belongings not in one’s actual physical possession).
145 Compare United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
police must have probable cause, not a lesser quantum of evidence, to believe that a sus-
pect lives in a residence and is inside at the time of entry), with People v. Downey, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 402, 408 (Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting the novel interpretation of the Ninth Circuit,
the only circuit to require probable cause).
146 Compare United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (declining to
adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting stops for completed misdemeanors, stating that the
“court must balance the ‘nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion’” (quoting
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985))), with Blaisdell v. Comm’r Pub. Safety,
375 N.W.2d 880, 883–84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (deeming such stops unconstitutional),
aff’d, 381 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1986); compare Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364
F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (prohibiting stops for completed misdemeanors), with
State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356–57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (declining to adopt
a bright-line rule prohibiting such stops).
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• enter a home without a warrant in “hot pursuit” to arrest a fleeing
misdemeanant (as opposed to a felon)147
• search or arrest a motorist after a canine alerts to the presence of
drugs in his car, when the ensuing search yields no drugs148
• conduct an auto checkpoint, resulting in discovery of criminal activity,
without authorization by an elected official149
• retain a motorist’s license without qualifying as a seizure.150
Intrastate disputes also exist on basic questions of Fourth Amendment stand-
ing to challenge conduct by law enforcement.151
State and lower federal courts within the same federal circuit also differ
on Fifth and Sixth Amendment questions.  For example, with the Fifth
Amendment, they disagree on the application of the “question first,
Mirandize later” test announced by the Court in Missouri v. Seibert,152 splitting
over whether the plurality’s multi-factor test or Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion (requiring subjective intent by police to avoid Miranda) is the
rule.153  They also disagree on whether a Terry stop154 or handcuffing during
147 Compare Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that
warrantless entry was not justified by hot pursuit doctrine in order to arrest a suspect for a
“traffic misdemeanor”), with State v. Hamilton, 710 P.2d 174, 175 (Utah 1985) (upholding
warrantless entry onto a suspect’s property when “the officer was literally in ‘hot pursuit’ of
a person who had been observed committing an offense, albeit a [traffic misdemeanor]”).
148 Compare United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045–46 (10th Cir. 1998)
(upholding the warrantless search and arrest of a motorist under such circumstances), with
State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 415 (Kan. 2006) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s position,
endorsed by only one other court among many addressing the issue).
149 Compare Brouhard v. Lee, 125 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that police-
operated auto checkpoints must be authorized by publicly elected official), with Sheridan
v. State, 247 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Ark. 2007) (rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s position).
150 Compare United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that a seizure occurs when an officer retains an individual’s driver’s license), with
Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1187–88 (Fla. 2006) (declining to adopt the Eleventh
Circuit’s bright-line rule and holding a seizure did not occur in light of the totality of the
circumstances), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007).
151 Compare United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887–88 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
an unauthorized driver of a rental car does not have standing to challenge the legality of a
search), with State v. Bass, 300 P.3d 1193, 1200–01 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (rejecting the
Tenth Circuit’s position); compare United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1990)
(stating that an unauthorized driver does not have standing), with Parker v. State, 182
S.W.3d 923, 926–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting and rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s posi-
tion); compare United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
an unauthorized driver has standing), with State v. Cutler, 159 P.3d 909, 911–12 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2007) (noting and rejecting the Ninth Circuit position).
152 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
153 Compare United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2006) (adopting
the test urged by Justice Kennedy requiring finding of officer’s subjective intent to avoid
Miranda requirements), with State v. Pye, 653 S.E.2d 450, 453 n.6 (Ga. 2007) (rejecting
that position).
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the execution of a search warrant155 qualifies as “custody” sufficient to trig-
ger Miranda requirements.  In the Sixth Amendment context, conflict exists
on questions such as the factors used to determine when an individual
becomes a “government agent” sufficient to trigger the Amendment’s
protections.156
The conflicts noted above highlight the long-ignored but quite extensive
empiric reality of state-federal constitutional disuniformity within individual
states.  They also, as discussed next, have a variety of important real-world
consequences.
1. Rule of Law
Perhaps most significant, the conflicts undercut basic rule of law expec-
tations.  Allowing the content of national constitutional law to depend on the
uniform worn by a particular government agent or whether a case is filed in
state or federal court is at odds with the core expectation of horizontal con-
sistency in the law’s content and application.157  As Professor Daniel Meador
has observed:
One of the most basic features of law is that it embodies a set of rules and
principles applicable to everyone in like manner throughout the jurisdiction
it purports to govern.  A judicial system that produces legal doctrine differ-
ing because of the happenstance of the place of litigation and of the particu-
lar judges sitting on the case is hostile to the reign of law.158
Concern over rights inconsistency, it might be offered, is unwarranted
given the constitutional variation that already exists as a result of state court
154 Compare United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
position that the Terry seizure analysis drives Miranda analysis), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 947
(2004), with State v. Torres, 500 A.2d 1299, 1302 (Conn. 1985) (employing the Terry analy-
sis in assessing whether the defendant was in custody); compare United States v. Leshuk, 65
F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that when a Terry stop is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment a suspect is not in custody for Miranda purposes), with Longshore
v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1146 (Md. 2007) (rejecting the position that Terry seizure and
Miranda custody analyses are synonymous).
155 Compare United States v. Bullard, No. 95-5785, 1996 WL 683790, at *6 (4th Cir. Nov.
27, 1996) (holding that handcuffed defendant was in custody), with Smith v. State, 974
A.2d 991, 1012–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (adopting the contrary view); compare United
States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a handcuffed defendant
was in custody), with State v. Palmer, 14 So. 3d 304, 310 (La. 2009) (adopting the contrary
view).
156 Compare United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that for a
Sixth Amendment right to be triggered a government cooperation agreement must specifi-
cally target the defendant), with Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 40 (Mass.
2007) (rejecting the First Circuit’s position).
157 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1249 (1999) (“A central feature of the rule of law is its horizontal consistency of
application.”).
158 Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of
the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 639 (1989).
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power to interpret state constitutions more generously than the federal con-
stitution.159  Here, however, courts disagree over rights contained (or not) in
the same constitution, one that controls in state and federal courts and
regardless of whether the action of state or federal law enforcement agents is
challenged.160
Under such circumstances, as the Supreme Court has warned, individu-
als “cannot know the scope of [their] constitutional protection.”161  They
lack advance knowledge of their liberty and privacy rights and the parameters
of government power to investigate and intrude on their lives.162  State-fed-
eral court conflicts, moreover, have an impact that is greater than the sum of
their individual parts.  They create what is effectively a constitutional prism in
a state,163 and perhaps even several states within a given circuit when state
courts themselves differ with one another and their circuit,164 magnifying in
corresponding degree concern over governmental consistency and even-
handedness.165
159 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
160 See Head v. State, 322 S.E.2d 228, 231 (Ga. 1984) (“[W]e must acknowledge that
while this court is not bound by the rulings of the federal court of appeals for our circuit,
the citizens of this state, including prison officials, are most assuredly bound by the orders
emanating from such rulings.”).
161 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981); see also State v. Kock, 725 P.2d
1285, 1287 (Or. 1986) (averring that citizens “have their constitutional rights spelled out as
clearly as possible”); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).
162 In the context of Miranda doctrine, as a dissenting member of the California
Supreme Court said in relation to the majority’s adoption of a less protective position than
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the conflict both “invites forum shopping . . . and causes
confusion for anyone arrested in California on a question that is always important: If I
remain silent, can my silence be used against me or not?”  People v. Tom, 331 P.3d 303,
324 (Cal. 2014) (Liu, J., dissenting).
163 It is worth noting that the current uncertainty would have been heightened had
states such as California been segmented into two or more circuits, as once proposed to
reduce especially heavy circuit caseloads. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of
Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974).
164 For example, with respect to the criteria used to determine whether police justifia-
bly entered a home without a search warrant based on concern that evidence might be
destroyed, compare United States v. Mongold, 528 F. App’x 944, 949 (10th Cir. 2013)
(specifying four factors to consider, including that a “serious crime” is involved), with Peo-
ple v. Wehmas, 246 P.3d 642, 649 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (specifying four factors to con-
sider but omitting mention of crime seriousness and adding, unlike the Tenth Circuit, that
persons likely must be aware of police presence), and State v. Maxwell, 275 P.3d 220, 224
(Utah 2011) (applying a general reasonableness test). See also, e.g., State v. Gilstrap, 332
P.3d 43, 45–46 (noting, with respect to the question of whether police can search the
belongings of a visitor at a residence, the position adopted by Arizona and Oregon courts
conflicts with that of Alaska, California, and Hawaii courts, all of which differ from the
position adopted by the Ninth Circuit).
165 See FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (“Stripped of all [its]
technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules
fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee . . . how . . .
authority will use . . . coercive powers in given circumstances . . . .”); JERRY L. MASHAW,
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Of no less practical importance, intrastate variation creates the risk of
forum shopping by government prosecutors.  When a state and federal court
adopt different positions it can be outcome-determinative whether (i) state/
local police or federal agents develop the case against a suspect166 and (ii) in
an instance of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, whether a matter is filed in
state or federal court.167  Faced with the prospect of having evidence sup-
pressed in one court but not another, governments have a powerful incentive
to seek out more advantageous doctrine,168 aggravating law-avoidance
already occurring when cases “go federal” in an effort to avoid application of
a more generous state constitutional right.169  To the extent that such strate-
gic behavior undermines perception of government (writ large) cutting
square corners,170 the procedural justice literature suggests an attendant
decrease in the public’s sense of governmental legitimacy and its willingness
to be law-abiding.171
2. Civil Rights Litigation
The conflicts can also affect civil rights litigation.  Under § 1983, officers
enjoy personal qualified immunity from damage suits except when they vio-
late “clearly established” constitutional law and are “plainly incompetent.”172
Although it was long the case that a state-federal conflict put law enforce-
ment in the unenviable position of facing monetary liability for complying
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 138–39 (1997) (defining rule of law as “a system of objec-
tive and accessible commands, law which can be seen to flow from collective agreement
rather than from the exercise of discretion or preference by those . . . who happen to be in
positions of authority”).
166 On the phenomenon more generally, see Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The
Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2013).
167 See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1245
(2010).
168 See George C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons to Be Skeptical of
Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 47, 51
(2001) (discussing the influence of possible exclusion on filing decisions).
169 See Logan, supra note 166, at 320.  A predisposition, it should not go unmentioned,
that itself often goes unmediated by state prosecutorial desire to retain jurisdiction. See
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109
MICH. L. REV. 519, 577 (2011) (“Local prosecutors are typically quite happy to have federal
prosecutors take on local cases so that defendants receive longer sentences, and they often
willingly use the prospect of federal prosecution to gain leverage in their own plea negotia-
tions with defendants.  Local police officers also often prefer the federal option for the
same reasons.” (footnote omitted)).
170 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 116 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The crim-
inal defendant is an involuntary litigant . . . .”).
171 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 101–02 (2002); Tom R.
Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in
their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 240 (2008).
172 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
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with a position adopted by their employer-government’s court,173 recent
Supreme Court precedent has clarified that when a conflict exists and an
officer acts in accord with her jurisdiction’s doctrinal position, clearly estab-
lished law cannot be said to have been violated.174  The newly clarified posi-
tion, however, comes at a cost: a right, recognized by either state or federal
court, goes unenforced.175
Conflict can also have a critical impact on less core yet still important
matters in civil rights litigation.  A prime example lays in varied judicial posi-
tions on whether a particular government actor qualifies as a “state” agent
sufficient to bar suit under the Eleventh Amendment.176  The California
Supreme Court, for instance, has held that a county sheriff is a state agent for
purposes of § 1983, barring suit;177 the Ninth Circuit disagrees, and so will
entertain a claim against a county sheriff.178  Because federal civil rights
claims can be filed in state or federal court,179 the specter of forum shopping
again looms, this time among plaintiffs (not prosecutors).
173 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 772 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] decision by a
state court contrary to a holding of this court cannot unsettle or ‘de-establish’ the clarity of
federal law. . . . ‘If the right is clearly established by decisional authority of the Supreme
Court or this Circuit, our inquiry should come to an end.’”) (quoting Boyd v. Benton
Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1751 n.105
(1991) (“Questions about whether federal courts should treat precedents from state courts
as clearly establishing the law (and vice versa) obviously add substantial complexity [to the
qualified immunity analysis].”); Richard B. Saphire, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases
and the Role of State Decisional Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 627–34 (1993) (surveying state and
lower federal court positions on the question, and noting that state courts on occasion
looked to federal law but not vice versa).
174 See Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (noting that it was “especially troubling
that the Ninth Circuit would conclude that [the defendant state officer] was plainly incom-
petent—and subject to personal liability for damages—based on actions that were lawful
according to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted”); cf. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2086
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When faced with inconsistent legal rules in different jurisdic-
tions, national officeholders should be given some deference for qualified immunity pur-
poses, at least if they implement policies consistent with the governing law of the
jurisdiction where the action is taken.”).
175 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 115, 131 (noting that willingness of courts to deem a right unsettled results in “the
underenforcement of constitutional rights while such uncertainty continues.”).
176 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207,
207–08 (2013) (“The right being enforced is irrelevant to constitutional tort doctrine.
What matters instead is the identity of the defendant . . . . States and state agencies are
absolutely immune from damages liability for violations of constitutional rights, no matter
how egregious their conduct may be.”).
177 Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 87 P.3d 1, 21 (Cal. 2004).
178 Nelson v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (noting
the tension).
179 See Saphire, supra note 173 (“[P]laintiffs who wish to litigate section 1983 claims
have a choice of filing suit in state or federal court.”).
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3. “Good Faith” and the Exclusionary Rule
Finally, variability can affect trial court decisions on the exclusion of evi-
dence, in particular, application of the exclusionary rule’s “good faith”
exception, which protects police acting with an objectively “reasonable good-
faith belief” that their conduct is lawful.180  Recently, in Davis v. United
States,181 the Supreme Court held that the exception applies when police
comply with settled doctrine, even when the doctrine is later overturned by
the Court.182  In Davis, Alabama police relied on Eleventh Circuit caselaw
based on accepted Supreme Court doctrine affording them a per se right to
search the interior of a car incident to the lawful arrest of the driver,183 a
position disavowed by the Court after the search of Davis’s car.184  According
to the majority, the officer at the time of the search reasonably relied upon
and acted in a manner consistent with Supreme Court (and Eleventh Cir-
cuit) doctrine, removing any deterrence function served by the exclusionary
rule.185
The reliance question, however, is less clear when settled U.S. Supreme
Court doctrine is not involved.  What should the outcome be when the Court
has not definitively spoken on the propriety of particular police conduct, and
a state court has approved the conduct while its federal circuit has not (or
vice versa), and the Court later condemns the conduct?  Presumably, akin to
the § 1983 context just discussed, agents acting in a manner consistent with a
position adopted by their government’s courts would be able to invoke the
good faith exception.  But if this is so then again the forum-filing decision of
prosecutors can drive outcomes.  In light of the discord, a preferred out-
come, suggested during the Davis oral argument by Justice Sotomayor vis-a`-
vis federal circuit splits,186 might be for the doctrinal uncertainty to bar
application of the good faith exception.  However, at present no such policy
prevails, leaving outcomes to again vary with prosecutorial will.
180 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring)).
181 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
182 Id. at 2429 (“[W]hen binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular
police practice, well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-
detection and public-safety responsibilities.”).
183 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
184 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
185 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
186 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 09-11328), 2011
WL 972573, at *33 (“JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, if there’s a circuit split, how do we
encourage police officers to be careful about the Fourth Amendment? . . . . If there’s a
circuit split and a police officer knows that other circuits are saying this is unconstitutional,
why are we taking away the deterrent effect of having thoughts occur to the officer about
thinking through whether there’s a better way and a legal way to do things?”).
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III. OBLIGING THE SUPREME COURT TO BE MORE “SUPREME”
As the preceding discussion makes clear, state-federal conflicts, while an
inevitable and indeed beneficial byproduct of the nation’s federalist system,
create an array of significant problems.  The challenge lies in arriving at a
solution that accommodates these realities.  This Part lays the foundation for
the solution proposed in Part IV, by examining reforms proposed to date
directed at mediating federal constitutional conflict.
A. Prior Proposals
Although over the years most concern over constitutional conflict has
centered on differences between and among the federal circuits,187 state-fed-
eral disuniformity has drawn a degree of limited attention.188  One proposal,
offered by Professor Daniel Meador in the early 1980s, urged creation of a
new federal tribunal to review state court decisions concerning federal consti-
tutional questions,189 similar to the “national court of appeals” long sug-
gested to resolve federal circuit conflicts.190  Professor Meador saw the main
advantage of the proposal as being that it would provide a “measure of
nationwide uniformity . . . . The same tribunal would pass on all federal con-
stitutional questions arising in state criminal proceedings.  Thus the law
could be kept on an even keel, and its development could be monitored
more effectively.”191
Allowing direct appeal of state cases to a national intermediate federal
tribunal, however, would be problematic for several reasons.  Most signifi-
cant, subjecting state courts to direct oversight by an u¨ber lower federal court
would signal a troubling institutional distrust of state courts.192  More practi-
187 Of the many study groups and commissions over the years, the Hruska Commission
and the Federal Courts Study Committee were most prominent. See COMM’N ON REVISION
OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION
REPORT]; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE (1990).
188 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
REPORT ON COURTS 129–31 (1973).
189 Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 273 (1983).
190 See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 187, at 206–07 (voicing concern over
“differences in legal rules applied by . . . circuits [that] result in unequal treatment of
citizens . . . solely because of differences in geography); id. at 208 (urging “creation of a
new national court of appeals, designed to increase the capacity of the . . . judicial system
for definitive adjudication of issues of national law”).
191 Meador, supra note 189, at 280.
192 Indeed, this very concern has driven ongoing efforts to limit federal habeas corpus
review of state decisions. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (“Resort to
habeas corpus . . . results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of govern-
ment.”); Good v. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “traditional
federalism and comity principles . . . animated Stone v. Powell” and these “considera-
tions . . . take center stage whenever evaluating the scope of federal habeas review”).
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cally, the proposal itself, now over thirty years old, has suffered the same lack
of success experienced by the national court of appeals vis-a`-vis federal circuit
splits, quelled by the Supreme Court’s estimable ability to neutralize any per-
ceived incursion on its appellate prerogative.193  Equally unlikely to succeed
for similar institutional reasons, and problematic for similarly succumbing to
federal judicial-centrism, is the recent proposal that the Court’s merits case
logjam be remedied by creation of a new certiorari division, consisting of
federal circuit judges, who would select cases for the Court to address.194
It has also been suggested that state courts simply defer to lower federal
court wisdom,195 including that they follow federal positions in “lockstep”
fashion, much as they often do in interpreting their own constitutions.196
Such proposals, while ensuring uniformity, are deeply problematic because
they again undercut state autonomy and ignore the instrumental benefits
surveyed above.197  They also risk lock-in of unfounded or unwise positions
adopted by a majority (or consensus) of lower federal courts,198 which could
reflect nothing more than a bandwagon effect being at work,199 and would
have the practical effect of precluding state courts from adopting minority
193 See Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A
Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395 (2000); David S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99
GEO. L.J. 779 (2011).
194 See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving
the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009).
195 See Matthews, supra note 20, at 83 (urging that state courts defer to federal courts
“whenever possible”); Moyer, supra note 126, at 197–98, 206 (calling the federal circuit the
“agent” of the Supreme Court and stating that “when a state court fails to follow the deci-
sion of a lower federal court that has interpreted the Fourth Amendment, it is implicitly
rejecting the determinations of the U.S. Supreme Court as to what constitutes a minimally
acceptable floor to effectuate fundamental constitutional rights”); Zeigler, supra note 20,
at 1212 (“State courts generally should consider themselves bound by lower federal court
decisions when many . . . have considered an issue and all have reached the same
conclusion.”).
196 See M. Jason Hale, Note, Federal Questions, State Courts, and the Lockstep Doctrine, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 927 (2007).
197 See supra Section I.B.
198 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 415 (Kan. 2006) (rejecting Tenth Circuit
position allowing warrantless arrest of motorist, endorsed by only one other court); see also
Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1959) (“Any rule which
would require the state courts to follow in all cases the decisions of one or more lower
federal courts would be undesirable, as it would have the effect of binding the state courts
where neither the reasoning nor the number of federal cases is found persuasive.”); cf.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (“Comity is not a rule of
law . . . .  If it were, the indiscrete action of one court might become a precedent, increas-
ing in weight with each successive adjudication, until the whole country was tied down to
an unsound principle.”).
199 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive
Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999).
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positions that ultimately get adopted by the Court, such as occurred in Florida
v. Jardines, Georgia v. Randolph, and Arizona v. Gant.200
Less problematic, Professor Donald Zeigler has argued that state courts
should retain some interpretive independence but that they should seek to
“decide federal questions the way they believe the Supreme Court would
decide them.”201  State courts, he maintains, should strive to predict how the
U.S. Supreme Court would resolve a federal constitutional or statutory ques-
tion, serving in effect as the Court’s agent.202  With the “unifying perspec-
tive” afforded,203 states will be “more likely to reach consistent results if they
ask how the Supreme Court would evaluate conflicting lower court
decisions.”204
Requiring state courts to decide in line with how they think the Supreme
Court would rule is easier said than done, as Professor Zeigler himself
acknowledged.205  By the Court’s own admission, stare decisis is not an “inex-
orable command” in constitutional matters,206 and it is not unusual for the
Court to reverse itself when a rule proves “unworkable”207 or caselaw has
“undermined [a precedent’s] doctrinal underpinnings.”208  Predicting out-
comes in constitutional criminal procedure, a doctrinal area more unstable
than most,209 is especially problematic.210
200 See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. Florida v. J.L. affords another exam-
ple of a state court bucking the judicial trend and adopting a distinctly minority position
later embraced by the Court. See J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204, 212 (Fla. 1998) (Overton, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rejection of a “gun exception” for a Terry stop and
frisk conflicted with position of every other state and federal court, save the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania), unanimously aff’d sub nom., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000).
201 Zeigler, supra note 20, at 1177.
202 Id. at 1184.
203 Id. at 1184–85.
204 Id.; see also id. at 1187–88 (“[T]he goals of correct and uniform interpretation of
federal law can best be furthered if state courts decide federal questions the way they think
the Supreme Court would decide them.”).
205 Id. at 1189–1211 (noting, inter alia, the varied interpretive methods of the Justices
and the uncertain influence of their political preferences); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT,
THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 79 (2008) (“[T]he actual process of deciding cases has enough
play in the joints to make it difficult, if not impossible, to predict which particular prece-
dents the justices will agree to weaken, if not overrule.”); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the
Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715 (1995).  On problems with the principal-agent
model of decisionmaking model more generally, see Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent
Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 561–71 (2011).
206 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
207 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (“[T]he fact that a decision has
proved ‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.”).
208 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000).
209 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1282
(2008) (identifying criminal procedure as the area in which the Court has most often
reversed its own precedent).  For discussion of the Court’s tendency to engage in “stealth”
and “accidental” overruling of precedent, see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overrul-
ing (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), and Suzanna
Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969 (2011).
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Finally, it has been suggested that state courts be accorded freedom to
construe federal constitutional provisions more generously than the
Supreme Court, free of its review.  Justice John Paul Stevens has been the
most visible proponent of this view.211  In keeping with the Court’s early lim-
ited jurisdiction over state court treatment of federal claims, which allowed
review only of cases denying claim of a federal right,212 Justice Stevens has
urged that the Court withhold review when a state court has honored a fed-
eral rights claim and the state-government appellant in effect asserts that the
court “ ‘overprotected’ the citizen.”213  According to Justice Stevens, allowing
state courts such latitude would permit federal rights to be tailored “in the
light of local conditions,”214 without individual state preferences impacting
other states.215
Justice Stevens’s position has been advocated by and elaborated upon by
others,216 and while it has considerable appeal,217 it elides the serious diffi-
culties associated with intrastate disuniformity.  Even if Justice Stevens is cor-
rect that the impact of granting a more expansive right is not externalized to
other jurisdictions,218 the problem remains that negative effects will be inter-
210 See, e.g., State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 826 (Iowa 2013) (Appel, J., concurring)
(“[P]ast cases demonstrate that it is difficult to determine the methodology that the United
States Supreme Court will apply to determine a search and seizure issue.  In recent years,
the Supreme Court has applied at least five different analytical models . . . . [I]t is impossi-
ble to predict which model will apply.”).  On the instability of Fourth Amendment doctrine
more generally, see Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 933 (2010).
211 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 200 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dela-
ware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 396–98 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1067–70 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1031 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
213 Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
215 See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]o other state would have
been required to follow the [Kansas] precedent if it had been permitted to stand.”); Brig-
ham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Federal interests
are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens
than the Federal Constitution requires.”).
216 See Thomas H. Lee, Countermajoritarian Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123, 2132
(2006); Mazzone, supra note 19, at 73; Sager, supra note 92, at 1249.
217 Not by the lights of Justice Scalia, it is worth noting, who condemned “[t]urning a
blind eye to federal constitutional error that benefits criminal defendants.” Marsh, 548
U.S. at 185 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a
Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 258 (1988) (asserting that it is “wrong to
presuppose that decisions in favor of [individual civil liberties] are preferable” to decisions
favoring “government interests”).
218 See supra note 215 and accompanying text; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS 280–92 (1996) (arguing that disuniformity is unproblematic so long as a state
court decision does not externalize costs to other states and their citizens).
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nalized in individual states, as the variable doctrinal positions play out on the
streets and in state and federal courthouses.
B. The Imperative of Supreme Court Intervention
By design, the conflicts surveyed here can only be resolved by the
nation’s “one supreme Court.”219  It alone is “supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution,”220 and is empowered to resolve constitutional
uncertainty221 and ensure uniformity.222  State and lower federal courts alike
recognize the Court’s singular role in this regard and expect the Court to
fulfill its duty.223
In theory, the Court does so by exercise of its discretionary certiorari
authority.  Since first being afforded by Congress in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and augmented since, the Court’s certiorari power has been marked by
a quid pro quo: that, in return for being relieved of its historically heavy
219 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
220 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (internal quotation omit-
ted); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 681 n.79 (2012) (referring to the Supreme Court as “the
priestly interpreter of our Constitution”); Ratner, supra note 52, at 160–61 (“[The]
[C]ourt alone is expressly given appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the supreme law
of the land whether those cases are initiated in state or federal court. [The Court] is thus
the constitutional instrument for implementing the [S]upremacy [C]lause.”).
221 See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 350 (1855) (“[The nation] would be
incomplete and altogether insufficient for the great ends contemplated, unless a constitu-
tional arbiter was provided to give certainty and uniformity, in all of the States, to the
interpretation of the constitution and the legislation of congress . . . .”); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415–16 (1821) (“[N]othing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed . . . . [without] vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last
resort, all cases in which [the Constitution and federal laws] are involved.”).
222 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.1, at 638–39 (4th ed. 2003) (stat-
ing that the Court’s power to review state and lower federal court opinions “serves to
ensure the uniformity of federal law,” allowing “federal law [to] mean the same thing in all
parts of the country”); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379, 1385 (1997) (emphasizing Court’s role “as the
authoritative settler of constitutional meaning” and warning of “interpretive anarchy” in its
absence); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 578 (1973) (describing the core roles of
the Court as being “to define and vindicate . . . rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to
assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of
powers in a federal union”).
223 As the Florida Court of Appeals put it:
In a system where the decisions of lower federal courts in Florida are not binding
on the state courts, there may very well be occasions when the federal courts hold
one way, while the state courts hold the contrary. That is after all a consequence
of our system of dual sovereignty. The remedy is simple: the United States
Supreme Court can eliminate the conflict by simply taking up an appropriate case
for review.
Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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mandatory appellate caseload,224 the Court would use its power to settle con-
stitutional conflicts.225  The expectation is evidenced in the modern Court’s
own rules, which specify that a conflict qualifies as a “compelling reason[ ]”
to grant certiorari.226
As noted earlier, however, certiorari has not been up to the task.227
Even if at one time the Court could be expected to resolve constitutional
conflict via certiorari,228 today multiple intrastate conflicts exist.229  And the
Court, despite on occasion expressing awareness of state-federal constitu-
tional conflict more generally,230 and professing stalwart dedication to its set-
tlement role,231 ignores pleas for it to intervene.232
224 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 945–46, 963–68 (2013).
225 Id.; see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1685, 1705 (2000) (noting Justices’
assurance to Congress, when contemplating passage of the “Judges’ Bill” of 1925, “that
certiorari is always granted when there is a conflict between courts of appeals and would
always be granted when there was an arguable constitutional claim”).  On the Court’s
evolution from a mainly mandatory to an almost exclusively discretionary, certiorari-based
docket, see Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–18 (2011).
226 SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(b).
227 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
228 See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 517 (confidently stating that “[t]he national
interest in the uniform interpretation of . . . federal law is amply protected by the reviewing
power of the Supreme Court through certiorari.”); see also Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing
on S.2060 and S.2061 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 29-30 (1924) (state-
ment of Justice William Van Devanter) (“Whenever we find . . . a conflict [among the state
supreme courts or circuit courts of appeals] that, without more, leads to the granting of
the petition . . . .”); Authority in State Courts, supra note 20, at 948 (“Whichever forum, state
or federal, is chosen, the same opportunity for ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court is
available.  The uniformity thus assured prevents advantage from being taken of temporary
disharmony between state and lower federal court decisions.”).
229 See supra notes 133–56 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (noting that certiorari was
granted “in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals”).
231 See, e.g., Justices in Their Own Words: Granting Certiorari, supra note 37 (“Our main job
is to try to make sure [that] federal law is uniform across the country.”) (quoting Chief
Justice John Roberts)).
232 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.  Although beyond the scope of study
here, it bears mention that conflicts also arise regarding the constitutionality of state sub-
stantive law, and can endure for decades in the absence of Supreme Court intervention.
One such example concerns Florida’s disorderly conduct statute, which a federal district
court found unconstitutionally vague in 1970, expressing the “hope” that Florida state
courts would agree.  Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4, 10 (M.D. Fla. 1970).  The hope went
unfulfilled, with Florida courts upholding the law as recently as 1996, despite an interven-
ing finding by the Fifth Circuit that the law was unconstitutional. See DeWald v. Wyner, 674
So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing with disapproval Wiegand v. Seaver, 504
F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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It is hard to say why this is so, given the Court’s famously inscrutable
certiorari decision-making process.233  Perhaps the Justices are comforted by
the expectation that conflicts, if worthy of certiorari, will come before them
again;234 or that they will in time resolve themselves on their own through
the common law process.235  Even if correct, however, such self-assurance
gives short shrift to the real-world negative consequences of the discord,
noted earlier, accruing in the interim.236
From an institutional perspective, the Court’s failure is troubling
enough; yet it becomes more so in light of the fact that constitutional settle-
ment cannot be achieved by other means.  Without Supreme Court review, as
then-Professor Ruth Ginsburg noted, a state court can effectively immunize
its decision because “[t]he state court’s federal law determination [cannot]
be overturned” by the state electorate or legislature.237  At the same time,
federal constitutional amendment—through Article V238—holds no more
promise.  Although it is conceivable that a decision or series of decisions
from the Court could generate discord sufficient to trigger the amendment
process, it is highly unlikely that an unpopular state court decision would do
so, if for no other reason than that its effects would be cabined to a single
state.239
As a consequence, in the absence of Supreme Court intervention, state
and lower federal courts enjoy plenary power over federal constitutional law
in their respective spheres,240 without any felt obligation to coordinate or
233 See Watts, supra note 225, at 14–21 (discussing transparency concerns).
234 In one of the standard treatments of the Court’s agenda-setting dynamic, for
instance, William Perry relates how justices and their clerks see cases in terms of their
“fungibility”: that the issue raised in a petition will resurface in the petition pool.  H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 221 (1991).  According to one clerk: “[The issue is] going
to come up again if it’s really an important issue. . . . I can say I never really feared that if
we don’t take it now or miss this one, that we won’t have the chance to decide it again.” Id.
235 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
517, 521 (2003) (noting that the Court does not focus on splits “likely to heal”).
236 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982) (“[Y]ears may pass before the
Court finally invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality.”).
237 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 340, 343–44 (1978) (reviewing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
238 U.S. CONST. art. V.
239 See Mazzone, supra note 49, at 1050–51; see also id. (“While multiple state courts
ruling in a highly unpopular way on a constitutional issue might provoke an amendment,
such instances are likely to be very rare.”).  State court conflict with circuit norms could
conceivably be avoided by a state constitutional amendment.  Florida, for instance, in the
1980s amended its state constitution to reflect that search and seizure doctrine will con-
form to the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724,
730 (Fla. 2013) (citing and discussing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12).  An analogous provision
conceivably could be adopted to tie state court interpretation of the federal constitution to
Eleventh Circuit precedent.
240 See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (2007) (not-
ing that the Court’s shrunken docket results in federal circuits typically having final say
over federal law); Pfander, supra note 42, at 233 (“With the Court granting review in fewer
than eighty cases a year, and with only a relatively modest number of those cases coming
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standardize rules.241  Worse yet, the conflicts go unmediated by federal
habeas corpus review, which for many years allowed federal court oversight of
state decisions,242 but today, after major limits being imposed by the
Court243 and Congress,244 no longer meaningfully figures in the state-federal
decisional dynamic.245
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the absence of an effective and reliable certiorari regime, something
is needed to oblige the Supreme Court to resolve the conflicts surveyed here,
constituting what Justice Joseph Story referred to as the “jarring and discor-
from the state courts, state courts now exercise final authority in virtually every federal
question case that comes before them.”).
241 In this sense, they function in a manner akin to stand-alone industries in the
national marketplace, which are inured to “network effects” that pressure businesses to
standardize and conform to market norms. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 105 (1994) (“In markets with network
effects, there is [a] natural tendency toward de facto standardization, which means every-
one [is] using the same system.”).  On network effects more generally, see Mark A. Lemley
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479
(1998).
242 See, e.g., Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d 266, 273 (Ga. 1983) (“[W]e are not bound by
decisions of the lower federal courts.  Nonetheless, it would be . . . myopic of us to ignore
federal precedent, if only because of the inevitability of federal collateral review . . . .”);
Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965) (“If the Pennsylvania courts refuse
to abide by [the Third Circuit’s] conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny relief
need only to ‘walk across the street’ to gain a different result.  Such an unfortunate situa-
tion would cause disrespect for the law.”).
243 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that state court Fourth
Amendment decisions are to be reviewed only if a petitioner lacked a “full” and “fair”
opportunity to litigate the issue in state court); see also J. Thomas Sullivan, Danforth, Retro-
activity, and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 467 (2008) (“[Stone] effectively insulated the
bulk of state court determinations from review in the federal system except by petition for
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court itself.”).
244 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2012)).  As a result of the
AEDPA, a federal court is to assess only whether a state decision is “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or was based on an “unreasonable determination of
the facts.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2).  The Court has “emphasized, time and again, that
[the AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeal from relying on their own precedent to
conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.’”  Lopez v. Smith,
No. 13-946, 2014 WL 4956764, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (per curiam).
245 A state court decision, the Supreme Court has instructed, is to be invalidated only if
it is “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended
in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter,
131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011); see also Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New
Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judg-
ments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008) (discussing the vastly diminished
capacity of federal habeas review).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 37  8-DEC-14 14:43
2014] a  house  divided 271
dant judgments” that only the Court can “harmonize . . . into uniformity.”246
The prospect for change, it should be noted at the outset, is not likely to be
forthcoming from the Court itself, which reflexively resists any effort seen as
limiting its docket-selection prerogative.247
Yet an option remains that can compel the Court’s intervention: certifi-
cation.  Since 1802, certification has allowed disputed questions of federal
law, generated by lower federal courts, to get to the Supreme Court for reso-
lution.248  Absent certification, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1821, a “divi-
sion of opinion” might “remain[ ] and the question would continue
unsettled.”249
Certification was widely used in nineteenth-century criminal cases250
and it later figured centrally in congressional creation of the several federal
circuit courts of appeal to “guard against diversity of judgment in . . . differ-
ent courts.”251  Technically a vestige of the Court’s mandatory appellate juris-
diction,252 the availability of certification allayed congressional concern that
the Court would falter in its settlement role after it was afforded essentially
plenary certiorari discretion in 1925.253  Notwithstanding this pedigree, and
246 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
247 See Monaghan, supra note 220, at 679 (“The Court seeks as much freedom as possi-
ble over what is to be finally and authoritatively decided.”); Owens & Simon, supra note 36,
at 1283 (noting that unless the Court becomes more ideologically homogenous or includes
Justices determined to resolve conflicts that “the Court will continue to decide a small
number of cases per Term”).
248 Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159.
249 United States v. Daniel, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 542, 548 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
250 See Ratner, supra note 52, at 196 (noting the same and citing cases).  Indeed, it was
long the case that certification was the only way that a criminal matter could reach the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Rider, 163 U.S. 132, 138 (1896) (noting that with
criminal cases “a certificate of division was the only mode in which alleged errors could be
reviewed”).
251 See 21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1890) (statement of bill sponsor Sen. William Evarts).
252 See 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4038, at 62
(3d ed. 2007) (“In form and history . . . certified question jurisdiction is mandatory.”);
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1930) (“Petitions for certiorari the Court can deny, but questions
certified must be answered.”).
253 See Hartnett, supra note 225, at 1656 (“[C]ertiorari was envisioned as a sort of
fallback provision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occasion, to be surpris-
ingly careless in deciding cases or issuing certificates.”).
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the fact that certification remains a part of the U.S. Code,254 it has been used
only infrequently since 1940 (and not at all since 1981).255
Joining a handful of other scholars suggesting resuscitation of certifica-
tion more generally,256 I recently urged elsewhere that the certification stat-
ute be retooled by Congress to require that the Court accept a certified
question of constitutional law on which two or more federal circuit courts
have split.257  Certification is equally suited to resolve intra-circuit, state-fed-
eral conflicts yet Congress has never even nominally made the instrument
available to state courts.258
Although the reason for the absence of a state certification mechanism
cannot be identified with certainty,259 the omission is in keeping with the
common yet mistaken sensibility that federal courts are the sole source of
federal constitutional common law (and hence potential conflict).  The time
is long past due for Congress to expand certification and give effect to the
significant federal constitutional role that state courts have come to play.260
In so doing, Congress, which itself has a strong institutional interest in pro-
moting and ensuring the Court’s settlement role,261 would act in a manner
in keeping with the originating purpose of certification: to resolve intra-juris-
254 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2012) (providing for Court review “[b]y certification at any
time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which
instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding
instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in
controversy”).  Certification is also provided for in the Court’s rules. See SUP. CT. R. 19(1)
(“A United States court of appeals may certify to [the] Court a question or proposition of
law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.”).
255 See United States v. Seale, 558 U.S. 985, 986 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certified question).
256 See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard, Certified Questions in the Supreme Court: In Defense of an
Option, 83 DICK. L. REV. 31 (1978); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United
States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449–51 (2009); Aaron
Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
483, 491–92 (2010).
257 See Logan, supra note 9, at 1188–89.
258 See William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of February
13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1925) (“There is no review provided for by certification of
questions by the judges of the state court to the Supreme Court.”).
259 The omission might to some extent be explained by the fact that at the time of
Barron v. Baltimore (1833), and in 1802 when certification originated, state courts lacked an
explicit role vis-a`-vis federal constitutional interpretation.  However, the certification stat-
ute has been reconsidered on numerous occasions since then and was expanded in 1925 to
allow the Federal Court of Claims certification authority. See James Moore & Alan Vestal,
Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 17–19
(1949) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1255, repealed by Pub. L. 97-164, § 123, 96 Stat. 36 (1982)).
260 An evolution manifested, for instance, in the decision by Congress in 1914 to grant
the Court discretionary certiorari power beyond state cases denying a federal right to
include cases granting a federal right. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
261 See Grove, supra note 224, at 944–46 (surveying interest from the late nineteenth
century onward among members of Congress, from across the political spectrum, in the
institutional role of the Court as the arbiter of constitutional conflict).
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dictional conflicts (stemming from deadlocked two-judge circuit panels in
existence early in the nation’s history).262
Mindful of the political and institutional ramifications of adding to the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, however, the expansion in certification
should extend to only intrastate, state-federal circuit court conflicts.263
Although conflicts between other courts—state courts with one another and
a state court with a federal circuit in another region—are problematic in
principle, they do not present the many serious practical difficulties of intra-
state, state-federal conflicts noted above.264
The mechanics of the amended certification provision could largely
track those of the current regime.  As now required, consistent with congres-
sional authority to “regulat[e]” the Court’s appellate jurisdiction265 and the
Court’s limited original jurisdiction,266 the question of law certified should
be distinct and definite and be accompanied by a statement of undisputed
facts.267  Also, as is currently the case, the Court would enjoy authority to
dismiss a certified question due to failure to follow the aforementioned
262 See Moore & Vestal, supra note 259, at 12.
263 This is so even though the expansion in mandatory jurisdiction concerns construc-
tion of the U.S. Constitution, a task historically viewed as warranting such jurisdiction. See
William Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 18 (1916)
(“The only jurisdiction that [the Supreme Court] should be obliged to exercise . . . should
[relate to] questions of constitutional construction.”).  Historically, it is worth noting, the
scope of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction was seen as inconsistent with its settlement
function, with the crush of cases denying it opportunity to resolve conflict. See Grove,
supra note 224, at 971, 996.  The expansion proposed here is designed to serve that very
function.
264 As a matter of course, conflicts should concern disputes between state supreme
courts and federal circuit courts of appeal.  Conflicting decisions of state intermediate
courts of appeal could prove ephemeral, being resolved by a state supreme court, or war-
rant less concern because of their limited jurisdictional reach (say a region of a state, as
with Florida’s system).  Exceptions might be made for when a state supreme court has
denied review or when a state has a “unified” appellate system, where the decision of an
intermediate court affects an entire state.  In such a circumstance, a state supreme court or
intermediate appellate court should enjoy certification authority.
265 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Moore & Vestal, supra note 259, at 34–35
(“[W]here the certificate meets the established standards as to operative facts and distinct
and definite questions of law the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is invoked, and no
valid objection can . . . be based upon the decisive character of the certified
questions . . . .”).
266 See Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 577 (1930)
(noting that the Court only resolves certifications involving “distinct questions of law and
not of the whole case, for otherwise it would be assuming original jurisdiction withheld
from [the Court] by the Constitution”).
267 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 68, § 106, at 779.  According to Supreme Court Rule 19,
“[t]he certificate shall contain a statement of the nature of the case and the facts on which
the question or proposition of law arises.  Only questions or propositions of law may be
certified, and they shall be stated separately and with precision.” SUP. CT. R. 19(1).
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requirements,268 either on its own initiative or as a result of argument of the
parties.269
Current law on when a question can be certified, however, would benefit
from modification.  The certification statute at present provides that a court
can seek to have a question certified “at any time.”270  Adding a requirement
that a state or federal circuit court actually resolve a question in a conflicting
matter would reserve the Court’s resources for conflicts that actually come to
fruition and create the concrete harms surveyed above.  Requiring an actual
decision, moreover, would provide the Court with the benefit of the reason-
ing of lower courts, should it wish to avail itself of that reasoning.
Such a change would have several significant benefits.  First and fore-
most, it would allow for the accelerated, authoritative resolution of con-
flicts,271 which, while a natural and even beneficial part of the nation’s
constitutional structure, create an array of difficulties.272  It would also pro-
mote judicial efficiency,273 as it is not unusual for the same doctrinal dispute
to arise and exist not only in several states within a given circuit,274 but also
in other circuits.275
Second, the expansion would afford state and lower federal courts alike
a means to participate in the Court’s docket-assemblage process, again con-
268 See, e.g., Adams, Cunningham & Co. v. Jones, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 207, 213 (1838)
(“[T]o express an opinion upon the whole facts of the case, instead of particular points of
law growing out of the same[,] [is] a practice which is not deemed by the majority of the
Court to be correct, under the act of Congress on this subject.”).  An exception might also
exist when the question certified is already subject to resolution as a result of certiorari. See
United States v. Penaranda, 543 U.S. 1117 (2005).  In any such instance the Court should
specify why the certified questioned was dismissed. Cf. Watts, supra note 225, at 46–47
(urging that transparency interests oblige that the Court provide reasons for denials of
certiorari).
269 See Moore & Vestal, supra note 259, at 37 (“A party may move the Court to dismiss
the certificate as improper.  The parties are entitled to argue the certified questions; and
on their failure to do so the Court may dismiss the certification for want of prosecution.”
(footnote omitted)).
270 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2012) (allowing “certification at any time by a court of
appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are
desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or
require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.”).
271 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1909)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[Certified] questions are to be encouraged as a mode of dispos-
ing of cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way.”).
272 See supra Sections I.B, II.B.
273 Cf. Roger J. Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start at the Top, 77 JUDICATURE 104,
106–107 (1993) (“Where the Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue, but some circuits
have resolved the question in one way and some in another, litigation is encouraged in
those circuits that have not yet spoken.”); id. at 107 (“Aside from the fact that fairness is
lost and justice is not seen to be done, the lower courts become clogged with cases that
would not be brought if the law was clearly stated.”).
274 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g, supra notes 146, 151 and accompanying text.
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sistent with a main originating purpose of certification.276  Courts, not liti-
gants, would “distinguish a small handful of cases from the flood of
frequently worthless certiorari petitions that engulf the Court,”277 which
themselves regularly fail to highlight intrastate conflict.278  Doing so would
also loosen the grip of the powerful Supreme Court Bar, which has come
under criticism for its undue influence over the Court’s merits docket.279
Equally if not more important, the expansion would facilitate greater engage-
ment by the Court in the refinement of its criminal procedure doctrine,280
especially as it involves state courts,281 whose decisions today account for only
a negligible part of the Court’s docket282—a diminished number that has
disproportionately contributed to the massive decrease in the Court’s overall
docket size in recent years.283
Despite the foregoing benefits, the changes proposed will likely generate
opposition.  Those revering Bickelian “passive virtues” and judicial restraint
more generally,284 for instance, will not rush to embrace a more ambitious
276 Hartnett, supra note 225, at 1710 (“In the hearings on the [1925 Judges Act], it was
repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, but that
the courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control.”).
277 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 252, § 4038, at 65 & n.14.
278 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103
(2006) (No. 04-1067), 2005 WL 309364, at *5 (merely citing contrary Eleventh Circuit
position in lengthy string cite of multiple state and federal circuit court cases).
279 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the Supreme Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE
89, 89–90 (2009) (noting the influence of “an elite group of expert Supreme Court advo-
cates,” and criticizing its “undesirable skewing in the content of the Court’s docket”);
Watts, supra note 225, at 62–63 (discussing role of influential “expert Supreme Court bar”
and the capture risks that it creates).
280 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 436–37 (condemning the tendency of the Court to “remain[ ] aloof from the day-to-
day operation of the rules it lays down”); cf. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance
Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 206–07 (critiquing the Court for its
failure to address questions left unresolved in its decisions).
281 See Benesh & Martinek, supra note 75, at 817 (urging that the Court “tak[e] more
than a handful of cases from the state courts, thereby providing more guidance to the
lower courts and ensuring greater uniformity”); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of
State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 865 (1985)
(advocating increased review of state decisions to foster federal-state dialogue on federal
questions).
282 See The Supreme Court 2011 Term: The Statistics, 126 HARV. L. REV. 388, 397, 403
(2012) (noting that in the 2011 Term only 6 of 179 cases (including full opinions and
memorandum orders), or 0.03%, of cases disposed of, originated in state courts).
283 Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 352 (2002) (stating that the Court’s diminished docket size was
“significantly and . . . disproportionately” driven by the “sharp decline of state court cases
reviewed”).  Professor Solimine notes that in the four decades leading up to the 1990s the
Court reviewed on average thirty-seven state court cases per term, roughly 25% of the cases
decided in a term, and that the percentage of state cases decreased from 30% in 1989 to
16% in 1999. Id. at 353 tbl.1.
284 See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
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constitutional settlement role from the Court.  Indeed, to some the Court’s
lack of involvement is actually a good thing, allowing constitutional matters
to “percolate” until such time as the Court sees fit to intervene.285
Percolation, however, remains highly contestable, despite occasional
mention by the Court of its virtues.286  As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted over
twenty-five years ago:
[T]o . . . suggest that it is actually desirable to allow important questions of
federal law to “percolate” in the lower courts for a few years before the
Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion . . . .
. . . We are not engaged in a scientific experiment or in an effort to
square the circle . . . . [T]here is no obviously “correct” . . . answer in the
philosophical or mathematical sense, but the “definitive” answer, and the
definitive answer can be given . . . only by the court of last resort.  It is of
little solace to the litigant who lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to
learn that his case was part of the “percolation” process which ultimately
allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his position.287
Nor is percolation evidenced much in the actual workings of the
Supreme Court, based on the survey undertaken here of Roberts Court crim-
inal procedure decisions.  Only in a single instance did the Court forthrightly
articulate and contextualize doctrinal variation among state and lower fed-
eral courts on a question.288  Although the absence of overt critical examina-
tion of the merits of doctrinal positions of course does not conclusively
disprove operation of percolation,289 the failure to articulate intellectual
285 See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S
ROLE 48 (1986) (“The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue . . . has the
benefit of the experience of . . . lower courts, often yielding concrete information about
how a particular rule will ‘write,’ its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and the
merits of alternative approaches.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An
Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) (“[Conflicts] can be endured and some-
times . . . ought to be endured while judges and scholars observe the respective workings
out in practice of the conflicting rules . . . .”).
286 See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 399 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (con-
demning “[p]remature resolution of the novel [Fourth Amendment] question presented
[that] has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles”); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977) (noting the “wisdom of
allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration” by the lower courts).
287 William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 11 (1986); see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1408 (1987) (“We cannot accept the underlying logic
behind percolation—the notion that somehow a better reasoned Supreme Court decision
will result from subjecting citizens in different parts of the country to differing interpreta-
tions of the same national law . . . .”).
288 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858–61 (2011) (methodically surveying state
and federal court positions adopted on the “police-created” exigency doctrine).  Professor
Bruhl recently examined the Court’s invocation of lower court splits more generally, cover-
ing the period October 2010 through June 2013, and similarly concluded that “[l]ower-
court precedent enjoys at most modest influence on the Supreme Court.”  Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 922 (2014).
289 Logan, supra note 9, at 1169.
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underpinnings of competing decisions, at a minimum, undermines the pos-
ited informed deliberateness of percolation and justifies skepticism over its
place in constitutional decisionmaking.290  In any event, whatever advantages
that might accrue from percolation are substantially outweighed by the very
substantial costs of disuniformity.291  As noted by Justice Brandeis, “it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”292
A more valid potential concern lies in whether a state or federal court,
upon adopting a variant position, might lack incentive to certify.  In Arizona
v. Gant, for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court, preferring the discordant
position it adopted limiting police authority to search a car incident to arrest,
could well have been content to not run the risk of having itself reversed and
lose at least the state-bounded effect of its decision.  Given this possibility,
Congress should empower federal circuit courts with certification power in
the event of a conflict with state courts within their territory.  To further limit
the risk of avoidance, consideration should be given to allowing the Office of
the Solicitor General, an institutional actor charged with being a superinten-
dent of national law,293 to seek clarification by means of certification.294
Ultimately, the risk of avoidance would hopefully be mitigated by aware-
ness of the practical problems, highlighted here, resulting from conflict.  It
also can be hoped that a second-in-time deciding court will have an incentive
290 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 18, at 57 (“I doubt that the strength of an inferior
court’s conviction that a particular interpretation provides the best reading will—or
should—influence the Supreme Court’s independent judgment.”); Henry J. Friendly, The
“Law of the Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405, 407 (1972) (“I doubt whether
many of the Justices even read our opinions, at least on constitutional issues, except as
these are filtered through the briefs of counsel or the memoranda of law clerks.”).
291 See supra Section II.B.  The case for waiting is especially weak when a state court and
federal circuit court have decided a constitutional question, applicable to the single state
alone, and are at loggerheads.  In such an instance, no other avenue for redress—such as a
conflict arising between another state court and its federal circuit—will be at play, and the
conflict and the problems it generates will simply fester.
292 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Franklin Ford (Feb. 8, 1908), in THE ESSEN-
TIAL HOLMES 201 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (“[O]ne of the first things for a court to
remember is that people care more to know that the rules of the game will be stuck to,
than to have the best possible rules.”); see also Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme
Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 100 (2010)
(stating that it need not be the case that “the Court’s own decision will exhibit any particu-
larly great wisdom or serve the country well.  Rather, it is an almost Hobbesian argument
that there must be a sovereign to resolve controversies, and that such a role should be
played . . . by the Supreme Court.”).
293 See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1105 (1988); David R. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United
States, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1998).
294 Involvement of the Solicitor General in the certification process is not without pre-
cedent. See, e.g., United States v. Md. Casualty, 278 U.S. 663 (1928) (where Solicitor Gen-
eral, acting on behalf of the court of appeals judges, successfully moved for the dismissal of
a certificate as inadvertently made).
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to certify and have its constitutional position possibly vindicated by the
nation’s highest court and imposed nationwide.
Finally, it might be asserted that the proposal advanced here will flood
the Court with an unmanageable influx of cases.  Such a concern has little
warrant, however, given the limited expansion outlined here.  The conflicts
identified in Part II, despite the considerable difficulties they create, number
roughly only twenty; a volume that could be easily absorbed in a single
Term295 given the Court’s modest-sized docket.296  Nonetheless, to the
extent the Court feels that its increased workload is too onerous, it could
grant certiorari in fewer cases involving federal statutory interpretation con-
flicts, which as commentators have noted present less pressing need for
uniformity.297
CONCLUSION
Although it has long been accepted that state and lower federal courts
enjoy concurrent authority over the interpretation and application of the
U.S. Constitution,298 little attention has been paid to the ramifications of this
power-sharing arrangement.299  This Article has sought to remedy the deficit
by shining a spotlight on a particularly important outgrowth of state-federal
concurrent authority: the conflicting positions on federal constitutional crim-
inal procedure doctrine adopted by federal circuit and state courts within
individual states.300
295 Inasmuch as the conflicts identified here are not intended to be exhaustive in num-
ber, and more exist or come into existence, they could be addressed over two or more
Terms.
296 While today the Court decides roughly 80 cases a year, as recently as 1985 it decided
161 cases and in 1930 it decided 235 cases annually.  Starr, supra note 36, at 1369.  With
respect to the Fourth Amendment alone, as late as its 1990 Term, the Court resolved ten
cases a year. See Davies, supra note 210, at 1041 tbl.1.
297 See Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY.
L. REV. 535, 549 n.77 (2010) (condemning the undue emphasis on certiorari grants in
cases involving federal statutory conflicts, made in the name of achieving uniformity, while
acknowledging that “[o]f course, individual rights ought to be protected uniformly across
the country”); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 n.5 (2008)
(noting the same and that “[v]aried interpretation of federal constitutional law raises dif-
ferent, and arguably more troubling, questions”).
298 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
299 See Devins & Mansker, supra note 77, at 457 (footnote omitted) (“Notwithstanding
the profound and ever-growing influence of state supreme courts, their decision making
receives scant attention from journalists and legal academics.”).
300 The deficit is all the more glaring given the recent scholarly examination of state
court interpretation of federal statutory law. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and
the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 851 (2005); Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J.
1898, 1904 (2011).
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As this Article makes clear, creation of a “crazy quilt” of conflicting fed-
eral constitutional rights, which Justice Scalia has inveighed against,301 gener-
ates an array of distinct and quite significant difficulties when localized.  Yet
the problems and the conflicts giving rise to them often go unaddressed by
the Supreme Court, whose discretionary certiorari-based docket remains
smaller than at any time in its modern history.
In response, this Article has proposed that Congress amend the federal
certification statute to allow state and federal circuit courts to certify ques-
tions in instances of intrastate federal constitutional conflict.302  Doing so not
only will compel the Court to fulfill its role as the nation’s ultimate arbiter of
constitutional disputes and cure the serious problems that they create; it will
also elevate state courts to their rightful place in federal constitutional dis-
course and afford a mechanism for greater engagement between state and
lower federal courts and the nation’s “one supreme Court,” charged with
overseeing their work and ensuring federal constitutional consistency.
301 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also FRED P.
GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 40 (1970) (suggesting that the “checkerboard of
[criminal procedure] rights” during the pre-incorporation period “had to be short-lived”).
302 While the discussion here focuses on constitutional criminal procedure, which as
discussed presents particularly important questions of government power affecting liberty
and privacy, the certification mechanism proposed could extend to other contested federal
constitutional questions, which create similar difficulties.  However, any expansion would
of course have corresponding direct impact on the Court’s docket, which must be weighed.
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APPENDIX
Adopting the position that federal circuit precedent is not binding
(46 states and the District of Columbia):
State v. Crossman, 687 So. 2d 817, 820 (Ala. 1996); Harrison v. State, 791
P.2d 359, 363 (Alaska 1990); State v. Swoopes, 166 P.3d 945, 956 (Ariz. 2007);
Sheridan v. State, 247 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Ark. 2007); People v. Camacho, 3
P.3d 878, 882 n.1 (Cal. 2000); People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 941 (Colo.
1990); State v. Smith, 881 A.2d 160, 181 (Conn. 2005); Holloway v. United
States, 951 A.2d 59, 63 (D.C. 2008); State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla.
1970); Perez v. State, 657 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. 2008); Loher v. State, 193 P.3d
438, 452 n.16 (Haw. 2008); State v. Harmon, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (Idaho 1984);
People v. Brisbon, 544 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ill. 1989); Jackson v. State, 830
N.E.2d 920, 921 (Ind. 2005); State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa
2010);303 State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 415 (Kan. 2006); Cook v. Pop-
plewell, 394 S.W.3d 323, 346 (Ky. 2011); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218,
230 (La. 1996); State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me. 1986); Coard v.
State, 403 A.2d 826, 829 (Md. 1979); Comm. v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 39
(Mass. 2007); People v. Gillam, 734 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Mich. 2007); State v.
Roeschelein, 776 N.W.2d 480, 485 n.1 (Minn. 2009); Fulgham v. State, 47 So.
3d 698, 701 (Miss. 2010); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 900 (Mo. 1995);
State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003); In re 3628 V Street, 628
N.W.2d 272, 277 (Neb. 2001); State v. Addison, 8 A.3d 118, 126 (N.H. 2010);
Blanton v. N. Las Vegas Mun. Court, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (Nev. 1987); State v.
Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 404 (N.J. 1965); State v. Fiorina, 495 P.2d 1379, 1388
(N.M. 1972); People v. Kan, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (N.Y. 1991); State v.
McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (N.C. 1984); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326,
329 (N.D. 2007); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001); Phillips
v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1980); State v. Rinkin, 917 P.2d 1035,
1041 (Or. 1996); Hall v. Penn. Bd. Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa.
303 While the Louwrens court made clear its willingness to disagree with the Eighth Cir-
cuit, McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982), leaves some doubt. See id. at 13
(“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in exposition of the law of the United States Constitu-
tion . . . . We therefore make no attempt to arrive at our own independent interpretation
of the United States Constitution, but follow the federal decisions as we understand
them.”). McNabb, however, cited only U.S. Supreme Court precedent in support.  In addi-
tion, the Iowa Supreme Court is earlier on record as unequivocally insisting on its auton-
omy, at least vis-a`-vis interpreting federal statutory law. See Iowa Nat’l Bank v. Stewart, 232
N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa 1930) (“Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken,
state courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgment upon questions of fed-
eral law.  They are not concluded by, though they should give respectful consideration to,
the decisions of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . .” (citing Wells v. W. Union
Telegraph Co., 123 N.W. 371 (Iowa 1909))), rev’d on other grounds, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
Wells, despite its age, appears to remain good law in Iowa. See, e.g., Top of Iowa Coop. v.
Sime Farms, 608 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2000) (citing Wells for the proposition that the
Iowa Supreme Court need only “give respectful consideration” to the lower federal court
decisions concerning federal statutory law).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 47  8-DEC-14 14:43
2014] a  house  divided 281
2004); State v. Ware, 418 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I. 1980); In re Delgado, 306 S.E.2d 591,
596 (S.C. 1983); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 799 (S.D. 2010); Strouth v.
State, 999 SW.2d 759, 765 (Tenn. 1999); Ex parte Dangelo, 339 S.W.3d 143,
151 (Tex. 2010); State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076 (Vt. 1996); In re Markel, 111
P.3d 249, 253 n.4 (Wash. 2005); Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784, 786 (W. Va.
1974); State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wis. 1993).
Adopting a deferential position (1 state):
Atlas Mut. Ben. Ass’n v. Portscheller, 46 A.2d 643, 646 (Del. 1945).
Position uncertain (3 states):
Utah, Virginia,304 Wyoming.
304 Saunders v. Commonwealth, 753 S.E.2d 602, 607–08 & n.4 (Va. Ct. App. 2014)
(holding that Fourth Circuit deference is “merely persuasive”), review granted, No. 140507,
Sept. 10, 2014.
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